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EXISTING RULES OF TRUST ADMINISTRATION:
A STRANGLEHOLD ON THE TRUSTEE-
CONTROLLED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
I. THR, UNINCORPORATED Busnmmss *
JAN Z. KEASNOWIECKI t
In recent years there has been growing interest among trustmen
and estate planners in the problems surrounding the retention of a going
concern in trust. The discussion has centered on threshold tax and
nontax factors affecting the planning decision to retain rather than
sell the business and on the personal liabilities of the fiduciary who
continues an unincorporated business.' So far as I am aware, there
has been little discussion of the effect which existing rules of trust
administration have upon the vitality and financial stability of such a
business.
In this article I plan to show that the provisions made by existing
law for the administration of a going concern in trust are so outmoded
and unworkable that neither incorporation nor careful draftsmanship
can sufficiently assure its continued vitality and financial stability. The
existing rules of trust administration drive the trustee to outside
financing of operations which should be self-financed by the enterprise.
They force the estate planner to furnish the trustee, if possible, with
additional assets which can be invaded to sustain the operation of the
business. The encouragement which the rules of trust administration
lend to the process of outside financing and invasion of nonbusiness
assets of a trust to sustain the operation of the business prevent early
discovery of the financial instability of the enterprise and obscure the
point at which the business should be sold to protect the interests of
remaindermen.
* This is Part I of a two-part article. Part II will appear in a subsequent issue.
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1951, B.C.L.
1952, MA. 1955, Oxford; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University.
1 See TRUST Div., AmERICAN BANKERS ASs'N, HANDLING BUSINESSES IN TRUST
(1959); Becker, Trustee Management of Family Businesses, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES
506 (1961); Durand, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments-Retention of Dece-
dent's Business, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 907 (1956); Polasky, Planning For the Dis-
position of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Business, Part One-The Pro-
prietorship, 44 IoWA L. REv. 83 (1958); cf. Cahn, Estate Corporations, 86 U. PA.
L. REv. 136 (1937); Comment, The Fiduciary Aspects of Estate Corporations, 57
MicH. L. Rxv. 738 (1959); Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties
and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 713 (1961).
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The existing rules of trust administration applied to a going enter-
prise, though poorly conceived in the first instance, have become pro-
gressively less workable in an economy suffering from a steady decline
in the purchasing power of the dollar, rapid rates of obsolescence, and
a tax structure which throws the main burden of these forces upon
the smaller business.
Several factors seem to have rendered the application of the rules
of trust administration to the trustee operated or controlled business
relatively immune from reexamination. It has not been the prevailing
practice of estate planners to expose a going concern, whether incor-
porated or not, to the tender mercies of the trust law. Few smaller
concerns possess the business characteristics which are favorable to
their retention as an investment component of a trust estate.2  More-
over, retention in trust, rather than sale or outright disposition, must
be demanded by the family situation for which a plan is prepared.
Difficulties in estate tax valuation have, in general, led to widespread
use of buy-sell agreements designed to control such valuation.' It
should be noted, however, that certain provisions, new in the 1954
Code, have lent encouragement to retention.4
Apart from business, family, and tax considerations, a number
of which will be further developed in this article, institutional trustees
have been reluctant to undertake the administration of a going con-
cern, whether in corporate or sole proprietorship form.5 But the
drawbacks so far discussed by trustmen pale into comparative insig-
nificance in the light of the provision which rules of trust administra-
tion make for the continued vitality of the enterprise.
If one were not aware of the historical development of those rules,
one would be inclined to conclude that they were specifically designed
to lead to its improvident strangulation.
This point has not been sufficiently considered, possibly because
of a belief that an unrealistic underlying law is what the good draftsman
is for.' But this excuse for leaving well enough alone is not satis-
factory for two reasons. The first is that the law does not exist so
2 See 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 740-42 (2d ed. 1956) ; Polasky, supra note 1,
at 130-37; Tremayne, Estate Planning for the Mai With a Btusiness, 1955 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 40.
3 RIcE, FAmIY TAx PLANNING §§ 126-36 (1960) ; see Anderson, Disposition of
Business Interests, 9 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 459 (1956).
4 INT. REv. CoDE op 1954, §§ 303, 6166; see Washington, Redemption of Stock v.
Installment Payment of Estate Taxes, 38 TAxEs 721 (1960).
5 See Cronin, Caveat Fiduciary, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 392 (1955) ; McClatchey,
Liability of Fiduciaries in Operating Business Enterprises, 90 TRuSTS & ESTATES 528
(1951); cf. Trachtman, Closely Held Businesses-Responsibilities of the Executor
or Administrator, 90 TRuSTS & ESTATES 668 (1951).
6 1 suspect that one could rearrange the last four words of this sentence and still
remain with truth.
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that only experts can make it protect the individual. The second is
that an unrealistic rule in one area almost invariably results in diffi-
culties in another. At the risk of making an unfortunate suggestion,
it might be noted that provisions of a testamentary trust designed to
prevent a business from being driven into the ground may result in a
forfeiture of the marital deduction.
7
One of the odd fallacies which seems to have taken hold of those
who are willing to see the rules reformed is that it is sufficient to press
for the recognition of accepted accounting practices.
I. ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND RULES OF
TRUST ADMINISTRATION
Since 1947, when United States Steel sought to introduce a system
of accounting for exhaustion, wear, and obsolescence which would
recover in current dollars of diminishing buying power the same pur-
chasing power as the original expenditure,' the controversy over price-
level accounting has simmered, more or less explosively, in accounting
circles.' Although this article does not pretend to contribute to that
controversy, it must, even at the expense of stating some fairly mean-
ingless generalities, attempt to distinguish the particular interest of
the accountant from the interests of those who are concerned with the
success of the business enterprise.
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 (1956): "'[I]ncome' . . . means the amount of
income of an estate or trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of its
governing instrument and applicable local law. Trust provisions which depart funda-
mentally from concepts of local law in the determination of what constitutes income
are not recognized for this purpose." Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5);
Treas. Reg. §§20.2056(b)-5(f) (1), (3), (4) (1961). See pp. 546-47 infra.
8 See McMullen, Depreciation and High Costs: The Emerging Pattern, 88 3.
ACCOUNTANCY 302 (1949). The American Institute of Accountants early took a
firm stand against price-level accounting for depreciation, stating:
An attempt to recognize current prices in providing depreciation, to be con-
sistent, would require the serious step of formally recording appraised current
values for all properties, and continuous and consistent depredation charges
based on the new values. Without such formal steps, there would be no
objective standard by which to judge the propriety of the amounts of depre-
ciation charges against current income, and the significance of recorded
amounts of profit might be seriously impaired.
Comm. ON AccOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INST. OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING
RESEARC BULL. No. 33, DEPRECIATION AND HIGH COSTS (1947). In 1953 the posi-
tion taken in Bulletin No. 33 was reaffirmed by the Institute's Committee on Account-
ing Procedure. Comm. ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INST. OF ACCOUNT-
ANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, RESTATEMENT AND REvISION OF Ac-
COUNTING REsAcH BULLETINS 67 (1953). Six members of the Committee dissented,
being of the opinion that adjustments in depreciation based on accepted price indices
would offer a sufficient guarantee of objectivity. Id. at 69-71. Similarly, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission continues to disapprove price-level accounting for
statements to be filed with the Commission. SEC S-X, rule 320(c), 20 S.E.C.
ANN. REP. 107 (1954) ; 18 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 182 (1952).
9 See Paton, Depreciation--Concept and Meawrement , 108 J. ACCOUNTANCY 38
(1959).
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A. The Function of Accounting and Impediments to Change
One of the most important canons of accounting is the "going
concern" concept. "Accounts are, it is said, to be prepared on the
basis that the business is a going concern, not that it is to be
liquidated."'" This canon might conceivably support a system of ac-
counting which would reflect the fact that in a competitive economy
"it takes all the running you can do, to keep in one place." But the
accountant has never pretended to such a broad concept of his function.
Moreover, a business' failure to maintain its relative position vis-a-vis
its competitors is early reflected in its income statements. The effects
of inflation, however, are not so obvious. Failure to make provision
for replacement at higher cost, in fact, results in an overstatement of
income and may, if liberal dividend policies are pursued, lead to a
gradual contraction of the enterprise. Accountants have recognized
that this result is within the sphere of their concern."
George 0. May, characterizing the study made by a special group
of accountants and economists appointed by the American Institute of
Accountants, has aptly stated:
A major question presented by the study is whether the deter-
mination of income, as most usefully conceived, is to be
regarded as an accounting task, or whether the accountant
should accept, as the limit of his function, the classification
of facts and transactions in terms of money, and leave the
classification to be interpreted by others. In the monograph
I have assumed that accountants should be qualified and pre-
pared to perform both functions.'
However, when the determination of income "as most usefully con-
ceived" can be accomplished only at the expense of simplicity, the
accountant can afford the luxury of choosing simplicity. Provided the
conventions upon which his accounts are prepared are well understood,
he can leave them to be interpreted by others.
The major obstacle to reform of accounting conventions has been
the federal income tax law. Except in the case of L.I.F.O. inventories,
recognized in the Revenue Act of 1938,11 the income tax laws have
given no recognition to rising price levels, and any method of accounting
10MAY, Busnmxss INCOME AND PRICE LEvLs-Ax ACCoUNTING STUDY 21
(19-49).
"3 See Grady, Conservation of Productive Capital Through Recognition of Cur-
rent Cost of Depreciation, 30 AccOUNTING Rnv. 617 (1955); Peloubet, Are We
Giving Away Our Capital Without Knowing It?, 18 N.Y. CERT. PUB. ACCOUNTANT
440 (1948) ; Van Lierde, Price-Level Changes and Capital Consumption Allowances,
32 J. Bus. 370 (1959).
12 MAy, op. cit. supra note 10, at vi.
IsRevenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(d), 52 Stat 459 (now INT. REv. CoDE or
1954, § 472).
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which arrives at a net income figure different from "taxable income"
cannot be defended for its simplicity. In the past few years, therefore,
accountants and economists concerned with the effects of rising price
levels have concentrated their attack upon the federal income tax laws.
The Treasury's Bulletin F has been characterized as "always an
antiquated document looking backward instead of forward." 14 Its
depreciation rates for machinery have been blamed for our slow rate
of growth as compared with Canada and a number of European
countries.15
To relieve the plight of smaller businesses, section 179 was added
to the Internal Revenue Code in 1958.16 This section permits a
twenty per cent (or $10,000, whichever is smaller) writeoff in the first
year on business or income-producing property of the character which
is subject to the allowance for depreciation under section 167.17 Since
it does not disturb the principle that depreciation be taken on original
cost, section 179 will not lend impetus to a movement in favor of price-
level accounting.
Likewise, recent proposals to encourage investment in new plant
and equipment, such as those for allowing tax credits for such ex-
penditures " and Representative Keogh's "reinvestment depreciation"
scheme, 9 although they offer some relief to firms whose plans for
14Hearings on the Effects of Current Federal Tax Depreciation Policies on
Small Bitsiness Before Subcommittees of the Senate Select Committee on Snall
Business, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959) (statement of Joel Barlow, Covington &
Burling, Washington, D.C.).
15 Hearings on Tax Depreciation Policies, supra note 14, at 17-21 (app. II to
statement of Maurice E. Peloubet, C.P.A., Pogson, Peloubet & Co., New York City).
16 72 Stat. 1679 (1958) ; see H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1958).
17 See Treas. Reg. § 1.179 (1960).
.8 An Administration proposal for tax credits based on the relationship of the
investment to current depreciation would provide a credit against taxes of 15% of
the amount by which the investment in new productive assets exceeds current depre-
ciation and 6%b of the amount by which the investment in new productive assets
exceeds 50%o of current depreciation. These credits would be limited to 30% of the
tax liability in any one year, with provision for carryover. See H.R. Doc. No. 140,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1961). The measure has met with severe criticism. See
2 Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House Con-
nittee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 951-57 (1961). It is possible,
however, that Congress will adopt a straight 7% or 8% credit for investments in
new plants and equipment.
39 H.R. 422, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). This bill would continue depreciation
deductions based on cost. However, in the year of sale or abandonment of a business
asset and reinvestment in any new depreciable business asset-that is, in an asset of
the kind subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in § 167-it would allow
an additional "reinvestment" deduction of the amount by which the reinvestment
exceeds the original cost of the retired asset. No deduction would be allowed in any
taxable year in excess of the difference between the original cost of the retired asset
-more precisely, "the § 167A basis"-and such cost adjusted for increase in prices
according to an index prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury. The basis of the
new asset would be reduced by the additional deduction taken on the old, and the
bill provides for carryover into two succeeding taxable years.
Substantially the same measure was contained in Rep. Keogh's H.R. 131, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), and received favorable comments from a number of leading
[Vol.ll0:506
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expansion and replacement have been disrupted by inflation, would do
nothing to encourage price-level accounting, since they retain the
existing method of depreciation based on historical cost.
Until federal tax laws give recognition to price-level accounting,
simplicity will continue to demand adherence to traditional accounting.
Both the demands of simplicity and a healthy regard for the uncer-
tainties which would result from annual adjustment to predicted
inflationary trends support traditional accounting in the context of its
normal function of presenting data upon which those concerned with
the success of a business may act intelligently.
B. Influence of Accounting Concepts on Rules of
Trust Administration
It is an obvious fallacy to treat principles developed for the pur-
pose of presenting financial information as rules of conduct. Consider
the effect of a corporation law prohibiting accumulation of surplus:
such a law would lead either to the liquidation of most corporate enter-
prises or to a substantial revision of accounting principles. It is worth
noting that accountants have denied responsibility for measuring the
amount of funds necessary to maintain relative competitive position
and have been slow to account for increasing costs of replacements, pre-
cisely because the courts have been more than reluctant to interfere
with accumulation of surplus-and this proposition seems to hold quite
well vice-versa.
If a corporation law prohibiting accumulation of surplus seems
fantastic, what is to be said of the leading statutory contribution to
trust administration, the Uniform Principal and Income Act? 20 The
act carefully fails to provide for depreciation even on the basis of orig-
inal cost,21 and its specific provision for business enterprises speaks with
the studied ambiguity of the Delphic Oracle. Section 7 of the act reads:
accountants and lawyers in Hearings on Tax Depreciation Policies, supra note 14.
Most experts, however, favor accelerated depreciation as the most effective method
for encouraging investment in productive assets. See 2 Hearings on Tax Recom-
inendations, supra note 18, at 951-1007. On H.R. 422, see id. at 1029-33 (statement
of Rev. William T. Hogan, S.J, Director, Industrial Economics Program, Fordhain
University).
2 OThe act has been adopted in fourteen states.
2
1 UNIFoiiU PMaNC'PAL AND INcom AcT § 12. Alabama appears to be the only
state in which the legislature added a provision to § 12 allowing for depreciation.
ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 86 (5) (1958). In adopting the act, the Texas legislature added
a phrase to § 3 (3) : "All income after deduction of expenses properly chargeable to
it, including reasonable reserves, shall be paid . . . [to the income beneficiary]."
Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-27(c) (1960). (Emphasis added.) The Tax
Court recently held that the added phrase must be taken to authorize reserves for
depreciation. Mary Jane Little, 30 T.C. 936 (1958), reV'd, 274 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.
1960). For the question of whether a trustee may charge depreciation against income
-and the tax consequences thereof-see pp. 541-52 infra; cf. Kearney v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Where such business does not consist of buying and selling
property, the net income shall be computed in accordance with
the customary practice of such business, but not in such a way
as to decrease principal.'
The words "in accordance with the customary practice of such
business," presumably are intended to adopt accepted accounting prac-
tices. Thus, depreciation based on original cost would seem to be
authorized. The reference to "such business" may be a reference to
the prior accounting practices of the business in question or to the
practices of such businesses in general. If the former is intended, the
provision is even less defensible than otherwise.
The main defect of this provision stems from the fact that the
draftsmen forgot that they were preparing rules of conduct, not prin-
ciples to govern financial statements. As has been stated, accountants
would not long hold to existing practices if they really expected that
what they designate as net income would be unreservedly distributed
by those in control of the business enterprise. So what we have here
is a provision which requires a course of conduct by reference to ac-
cepted accounting practices, conduct which would make the accepted
practices unacceptable to accountants. A curious provision.
According to section 7, if a trustee has control over a corporation,
he may be under a duty to secure the distribution of all its earned
surplus, since earned surplus is admittedly net income "computed" in
accordance with accepted accounting practices. We should certainly
investigate the effect of such rules in the context of the incorporated
enterprise held in trust.
In the opinion of one writer, the wording of section 7 is particu-
larly felicitous because trustees are, he believes, authorized to follow
the accounting practices of the settlor.' But a sole proprietor may
distribute to himself all the income of his business, even reserves for
depreciation. It would be a tragedy if this provision were to be read
to require that the trustee follow the same practice. The sole
proprietor, surely, is not concerned whether he makes provision for
the continued operation of his enterprise by accumulation of assets in
the business or in his personal accounts. Not so with the corporation
2 2
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 7(2). Discussion of § 7 is sparse.
The draftsman, Dean Charles E. Clark, said simply that "in general the rules for
ascertaining profit and loss, made familiar by income tax legislation, are followed."
Clark, Interpretation of Proposed Uniform Principal and Income Act, 54 TRUST
CompmAxis 723, 725 (1932). Nossaman sets out the section in a footnote without
comment. Nossaman, The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 28 CALnF. L. REV.
.34, 44 n.39 (1939). The section is discussed with approval in Stayer, The Uniform
Principal and Income Act, 21 ORE. L. RaV. 217, 244-47 (1942).
2 3 Staver, m.pra note 22, at 247.
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which distributes all of its earnings to its shareholders or with the
trustee who distributes all the income of a business to his beneficiary.
It is not possible to pin one's hopes for section 7 on the enigmatic
"but not in such a way as to decrease the principal." As we shall see,
there is no authority in the decided cases for arriving at "principal"
other than in terms of the original dollar."
In the light of this criticism of section 7 of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act as it now stands, it is worth noting what the Com-
missioners have done in the most recent draft of the revision of that
actYr The words "customary practice of such business" have been
amended to "customary accounting practice for such business" and
the draft makes it explicit that "if the trustee continues the account-
ing practice of the owner used before the commencement of the trust,
the accounting practice is a customary accounting practice." This last
clause would seem to compound the suggested difficulty with the
present section 7, unless the opening words are to be taken to mean
"if the trustee chooses to continue. .... "
In any case, reference to "customary" accounting practices is not
very helpful. For example, does the revision put the trustee in a
position to take advantage of section 179 of the Code, the proposed tax
credits, or the proposals of Congressman Keogh? The answer is
simple; neither section 179 2 nor the proposal for tax credits extends
to trusts. I am certain also that trusts would be similarly excluded
from the proposal presented by Congressman Keogh. On the surface,
the reason given for excluding trusts is always that an extension of
such benefits to trusts would involve difficult administrative problems
in allocating the deductions or credits between the trust and its bene-
ficiaries 7  At the bottom, however, lurks the absurd and outmoded
law of trust administration. How would section 179, for example,
operate if it were extended to trusts?
2 4 See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, 220 Md. 275, 152
A.2d 184 (1959). The recent decision in In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With
Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 1960), raises doubts as to whether this position will
be maintained with regard to the trustee s duty to pursue sound investment practices.
Attempts to impose an affirmative duty to combat inflation have so far been rejected
by the courts. See Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865
(1958); Estate of Spitzer, 138 N.Y.L.J. No. 67, p. 14 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1957); Scully,
Changing Concepts of Trust Investments-Diversfication of Investments, 97 TRusTs
& EsTATEs 912 (1958); Tenney, The Trustee, the Stock Market and Mea.ure of
Damages, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 824 (1957).
25 UNIFORM REVISED PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 7 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1961).
26 INT. RXV. CODE OF 1954, § 179(d) (4).
27 This is the reason given for excluding trusts from the benefit of the tax credits
proposed by the President, note 18 supra. See 1 Hearings on Tax Recommendation,
supra note 18, at 260. The reason for excluding trusts from the benefit of the 20%
writeoff of § 179 is not officially given, but appears to be the same. Compare H.L
5735, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), with H.R. RE. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1958).
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As will appear in a fuller discussion of these points later, there
remains some doubt whether a trustee can set up reserves for de-
preciation on original trust assets.2 Section 179, of course, would
come into operation only as to new assets.2 As to those, trust
law not only fails to draw any distinction between "replacements" and
"improvements," but provides that improvements-and apparently
replacements-shall be depreciated on a straight-line basis. This de-
preciation, in trust law, is known as "amortization." Straight line
amortization of "improvements" is clearly required by section 12(4)
of the Uniform Principal and Income Act. The Restatement en-
visages amortization "in accordance with such reasonable plan as
[the trustee] . . . may adopt." " Professor Scott, however, assumes
straight-line amortization. 1
If one were able to state with certainty that the straight-line
schedule is the only one allowed for this "amortization," there would
still remain the question what "improvements" may be subject to this
treatment. The existing authority on the question defies simple de-
scription and for this reason must be left to a subsequent part of this
article. 2  Since straight-line amortization of improvements appears to
be fair to the income beneficiary, is required by section 12(4) of the
Uniform Principal and Income Act, and is favored by Scott, and since
"depreciation" in general has received only sporadic and reluctant ac-
ceptance in the law of trusts, it is not unreasonable to assume that,
at best, the trustee may use the straight-line method of accounting for
exhaustion and wear. On this assumption, it would be absurd to
extend to a trust the twenty per cent writeoff provided for in section
179 of the Internal Revenue Code, because most of it would pass
through to the current income beneficiary under section 17 6(g). Thus
28 This is certainly the case with regard to buildings, see In the Matter of Estate
of Davies, 197 Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd inem., 227 App. Div.
1021, 100 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1950); Copron, Reserves Against Depreciation of Real
Property Held by a Trustee, 12 OHio ST. L.J. 565 (1951), and may extend to fixtures,
see Evans v. Ockershausen, 100 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
633 (1939). The doubt has intruded itself upon trustee-controlled corporations.
See In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); In the Matter
of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937). But see
In the Matter of City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 306 N.Y. 733, 117 N.E.2d 910 (1954).
There is some support for the view that depredation may be taken by a trustee on
other than building and fixtures. The Restatement of Trusts does not expressly
recognize depreciation on original trust assets, but refers to "machinery and farm
implements" in comment (a) to § 239 authorizing "amortization" of wasting assets.
The cases lend support to depredation of business assets. See Rafferty v. Parker,
241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957) ; In re Trust Created by Will of Bailey, 241 Minn. 143,
62 N.W.2d 829 (1954) ; In the Matter of Jones, 103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E. 493 (1886).
2 9 INT. REV. CoDEo F 1954, § 179(a).
a0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 233, comment 1 (1959). See also id. § 239,
comment b.
Si 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 233.3, at 1759-60 (2d ed. 1956).
2 See pp. 524-29 infra.
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the ultimate justification for excluding trusts from the benefit of the
twenty per cent writeoff, and from similar benefits, whether by way
of additional deductions or credits, is that these measures, which are
intended to rescue the smaller business from the stifling effects of the
inflationary spiral, would not have their intended effect if applied to
trusts because the rules of trust administration place the trustee-held
business in a situation beyond rescue.
II. THE STRANGLEHOLD APPLIED:
Holmes v. Hrobon--AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
Holmes v. Hrobon 3 serves as a good illustration of the applica-
tion of trust administration rules to a going concern. Clay M. Thomas
died in 1938. By his will, after directing payment of certain legacies,
he left his Atlas Linen, Laundry & Supply business, a sole proprietor-
ship, to his executor as trustee, directing him to continue the business
"until such a time as the same can be sold, as a going business, for
a price, which, in the opinion of my said executor, and in the opinion
of my . . . wife, Mae Thomas, is a reasonable value thereof . .. ."
The will directed that the residuary estate, of which the business con-
stituted a principal asset, be held in trust to pay Mae Thomas "all the
income after the payment of operating expenses and taxes and other
charges from my business . . . . " The trust was to cease upon her
death, and the trustee was directed to convey and transfer the balance
of the property to the testator's heirs at law, share and share alike.
The opening entry in the records of the executor and information
scattered through the report indicate the following to have been the
financial position of the trust at its inception. The plant and equip-
ment of the Atlas business were worth $73,191.27. There was a mort-
gage on the land and building of the business with unpaid principal
of $17,500. Cash and accounts receivable were approximately equal
to accounts payable. Inventories were $20,847.16. Thus, excluding
accounts receivable, the operating assets of the Atlas business were
$94,038.43.
In addition to these assets the trustee received real estate (in the
process of development for housing) of a value of $156,209.69. Mort-
gages on this property were approximately $97,081." 4 The legacies
left by the testator's will amounted to $55,000. It can be seen that,
after payment of these legacies, the trustee was left with little more
3 93 Ohio App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 845 (1951), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 158 Ohio
St. 508, 110 N.E.2d 574 (1953).
34 The mortgage indebtedness of the estate was $114,581. In the figure given
the $17,500 mortgage on the Atlas property was subtracted.
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than the operating assets of the Atlas business subject to a mortgage
debt of $17,500.
The Atlas business was engaged in the manufacture, rental, supply,
and laundering of commercial and industrial linens. The trustee con-
tinued to operate the business. Up to August 31, 1946, he paid to
the widow, Mae Thomas, as income, a total of $263,299.72 8 -- an
average of $32,912 annually. On September 23, 1946, the widow
(who had remarried) demanded that the trustee pay over to her an
additional sum of approximately $300,000 which she claimed should
have been distributed to her as income of the trust. This figure in-
cluded $140,091.20 current income of the business used by the trustee
for "replacements" of machinery and equipment and $61,792.13 used
for "additions" to the physical plant. It also appears that the trustee
had used approximately $100,000 of current income from the Atlas
business to purchase five competing businesses in 1945.
Threatened by the widow's demand for additional distribution,
the trustee filed an action for a declaratory judgment. He asked the
court to determine a whole series of questions involving every facet
of his past and future administration of the business. Many of these
specific questions were not directly relevant to the widow's demand,
which, as we have seen, was addressed to the validity of the trustee's
use of current income for the purchase of competing businesses and
for "replacements and additions." The meaning which the court
assigned to these terms remains characteristically vague because of the
absence, in the opinion, of an adequate listing of the items referred to.
This, as will appear, is not so much a failure on the part of the court
to divulge relevant facts as it is an example of the appalling confusion
in the relevant law.
A. The Trustee's Method of Accounting
The trustee charged the expenditures for "replacements" and
"additions" to current income in the years in which they were made.
He then proposed to restore (and during the years 1938 to 1946
gradually did) to the widow the cost of replacements and additions
by crediting her income account with the depreciation calculated on
the items so purchased. The trustee's total expenditures on "improve-
ments" and "additions" (not counting the cost of the competing busi-
nesses) during the years 1938 to 1946 were $201,883.33.36 By 1946
the depreciation credits amounted to $39,823.18 for "replacements"
and $18,163.25 for "additions," or a total of $57,986.43. The opinion
of the Ohio Court of Appeals states:
35158 Ohio St. 508, 517, 110 N.E.2d 574, 580-81 (1953).
36 Of this $140,091.20 was for "replacements" and $61,792.13, for "additions."
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The difference between the latter figure and $201,883.33,
the total cost of such assets purchased up to the year of 1946,
will be credited back to net income of the life tenant in suc-
ceeding years so that by 1955 the total depreciation credits
will equal the amount of the cost of the assets.37
When the business was sold, according to the opinion of the
court, the trustee intended to distribute to the life beneficiary or her
estate, out of the proceeds of sale or out of the assets of the business,
an amount equal to the credits then shown on her income account.38 It
is difficult to accept this as a correct report of the trustee's method.
It seems clear that he did not set up reserves for depreciation on the
original assets of the business. In fact, his system, which was to take
expenditures for "replacements" out of current income, is inconsistent
with the existence of such reserves. He recognized, it appears, that
the widow had a claim to the amounts taken from current income and
expended upon "replacements" and "additions." Recognizing this,
he might have viewed the expenditures as, in effect, forced loans by
the widow to the business or forced investments by her in the produc-
tive assets purchased. If they are viewed as forced loans, the widow
was entitled to a return of the entire principal amount regardless of the
date on which the business happened to be sold or the widow hap-
pened to die. The trustee's reported method of accounting, however,
would return to the widow or her estate the whole of her "loan" only
if the business were sold or the widow died after 1955 (the date when
the credits would equal the expenditures).
If the expenditures are viewed as forced investments in productive
assets, the amount which should be returned to the widow is the un-
depreciated cost of the assets, not the depreciated cost. It is at this
point that the reported method of the trustee becomes incredible. He
surely did not expect to distribute the depreciated cost of assets out of
the proceeds from the sale of such assets unless he kept reserves for
depreciation on them. If he did keep reserves on the replaced assets,
it is hard to see on what theory he sought to justify depriving the
widow of the undepreciated cost of the assets. She, surely, would be
entitled to a return of her entire "investment" in these assets, on the
theory that any loss in the value of these assets is being restored by
depreciation charges to current income. At one point, the report of the
case suggests that the trustee may. have planned to distribute to the
widow the undepreciated cost of these assets.3 9 This would certainly
37 93 Ohio App. 1, 34-35, 103 N.E.2d 845, 86 (1951).
38 Id. at 35-36, 103 N.E.2d at 865.
agId. at 35, 103 N.E.2d at 865.
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be acceptable, from a theoretical point of view, but only if he did not
keep depreciation reserves on such assets. If he did keep depreciation
reserves on such assets, it is difficult to see why the widow would be
entitled to a return of all or part of the original investment before its
cost had been restored out of current income but not after.
Although, as reported, the trustee's method has little to recom-
mend it, a modified version of it is entitled to consideration:
(1) The trustee would not set up reserves for depreciation on
the business assets, whether on the original assets or on replacements
and additions; (2) he would charge all necessary expenditures for
"replacements" and "additions" to current income; (3) as to ex-
penditures on "replacements" he would make no further adjustments
in favor of the income beneficiary; (4) he would credit all expenditures
on "additions," as well as expenditures on replacements of "additions,"
to the income beneficiary's separate account; 40 (5) he would then
diminish these credits for "additions" by the amount of depreciation
on the assets represented by these credits; (6) when the business is
sold or the life beneficiary dies, the trustee would distribute to the
life beneficiary or her estate, out of the proceeds of sale or out of the
assets of the business, an amount equal to the credits then shown on
the income beneficiary's account.
Confined to "replacements," and apart from its incredible com-
plexities, this method is superior to a method which merely sets up
reserves for depreciation based on original cost and charges "replace-
ments" to corpus. It enables the trustee to replace at higher cost
without being driven to outside financing. Its major defect lies in
its haphazard effect on annual income. If expenditures for "replace-
ments" are kept at the same level annually the method can be de-
fended. It should be noted that if the expenditures are kept at the
same level annually the method in effect differs not at all from a de-
preciation reserve based on cost of replacement rather than on original
cost of the asset. Such expenditures, however, may be expected to
vary considerably from year to year. The fluctuations in annual in-
come which would result would impose substantial hardship on the
beneficiary.
Applied to "additions" the method poses a problem of different
dimensions. Even when such expenditures are kept on a constant level
from year to year, it cannot be said that this method has the same
effect on income distributable to the current income beneficiary as would
price-level accounting--since accountants do not purport to measure
40 The trustee would be faced with the almost impossible task of distinguishing
"additions" and "replacements of additions" from replacements of original assets.
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funds needed for expansion. Therefore, the question is whether, when
expansion is essential to the survival of the business, the trustee should
be required to seek outside financing. As we shall see, the glib solution
of existing trust law is to require the trustee to charge such expendi-
tures to corpus of the trust and amortize them, on a straight-line basis,
out of income. If the corpus is the business and no more, this solution
drives the trustee to outside financing. But amortization on a straight-
line basis makes this unavailable, since banks do not make it a practice
to agree to loans which are to be repaid over a period equal to the
useful life of the asset.4'
Here, then, in a nutshell, we have the problem facing the trustee
whose sole asset is the business. If he sets up reserves for deprecia-
tion "in accordance with accepted accounting practices" he may find
that he has insufficient funds for replacements at constantly increasing
costs. This will drive him to outside financing. Outside financing is his
only source of funds for necessary expansion. Whenever he is forced
to seek outside financing, trust law permits him to accumulate funds
for repaying the loan at a rate much slower than most lenders would
accept. Even when the trustee, by some form of juggling mixed with
magic, is able to keep up with his borrowings, the procedure is un-
sound financially, since interest which would have been moving in
favor of the income beneficiary, had the trustee retained enough funds
to meet the expenditures, is now moving to an outside party-a dead
loss to the estate as a whole.
B. The Decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals-The Traditional Rule
of Trust Administration
Needless to say, the Ohio Court of Appeals did not approve the
trustee's method of accounting and administration of the trust. The
proper method of accounting for "replacements" and "additions," the
court held, is set forth in the Restatement of Trusts, which requires
that all improvements be charged to corpus and that:
If the improvements are not permanent in character but
the probable life of the improvements is limited in duration,
although the cost of the improvements is payable out of prin-
cipal, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary entitled
in remainder to amortize the cost of such improvements out
of income, in accordance with such reasonable plan as he may
adopt.
41 See Hearings on Taz Depreciation Policies, supra note 14, at 4 (testimony of
Maurice E. Peloubet, C.P.A., Pogson, Peloubet & Co., New York City).
42 93 Ohio App. at 36, 103 N.E2d at 866, citing RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 233,
comment 1 (1935). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §233, comment 1 (1959),
for substantially the same provisions.
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The amortization required by the Restatement, the court held
without discussion, "should be computed by dividing the cost of the
article by the number of years of its life expectancy in use." " To
summarize, the court held:
If some of the assets which are considered to be corpus
are replaced, the cost is charged to the corpus and a de-
preciation charge should be made against the income of the
life tenant for each year during the life of such replacement.
The same is true with respect to additions which depreciate
through use and produce income.
So much, therefore, for the trustee's expenditures of $201,883.33
on replacements and additions. As to the purchase of competing busi-
nesses, the court held that the trustee exceeded his powers under the
trust instrument but that, having made the expenditure, he should ac-
count for it in the same manner as for the replacements and additions.45
The court concluded its opinion:
The court has not formulated definite and specific answers
to the questions propounded, believing that it would be suffi-
cient to lay down fundamental principles of law which are
applicable and controlling and being satisfied that counsel will
be able to draw the proper journal entry therefrom.46
It is a monument to counsel's skill and endurance that they were
able to draw such an entry-to appeal the decision. Let us assume that
all the "replacements" and "additions" were made in the second year
of operation (1940) and that their useful life was twenty years. In
1952, when the decree was entered,'the trust& would be required to
distribute to the widowv $80,753 because, had he charged the entire
sum to corpus in the first instance, $121,130 would by now have been
amortized against income. This -does not take into account the fact
that in 1940, according to our best guess, the trust assets did not
exceed $100,000.' How' thetrustee was supposed to charge $201,883
to this corpus taxes. the imagination. Even if the business assets, in
1940, consisted of $100,000, less .a reserve for depreciation of $50,000,
the expenditure for replacements.and additions would involve outside
financing to the tune of $151,883. Such financing would carry interest
which, according to well-settled rules of trust administration, is charge-
able to incbmeY
43 93 Ohio App. at 38, 103 N.E.2d at 867.
44 Id. at 36, 103 N.E.2d at 866. -
45Id. at 33-34, 103 Y.E.2d at 864-65.
.0Id. at 83,103 N.E.2d at 886.
4 7 UNIFORM P INcnP.L AND INcoME Acr § 12(1); REsTATEME T (SzcoND),
TRUSTS § 233, comment 1 (1959); 3'ScoTT, TRUSTS § 2332, at 1752-53 (2d ed. 1956).
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Even if the amount which now should be distributed to the in-
come beneficiary could be calculated by reference to assumptions as to
the type of loans the trustee could have secured, the interest rates, and
the number of times he would have been forced to refinance in order
to keep up with schedules of repayment (bearing in mind that he is
entitled only to charge the income beneficiary amortization on a
straight-line basis) -assumptions which defy demonstration-, how is
the trustee to provide the funds for such a distribution now?
The Ohio Court of Appeals summarized the position of the trustee
under the traditional rule of trust law as follows:
Had the trustee, in the conduct of the trust thus far, confined
his purchases of replacements and additions to items required
to take care of the normal increase in trade, it is our opinion
he would have been able to conduct the trust by securing bank
loans and mortgaging trust property 8
Bearing in mind that the court had held that expenditures of
about $200,000 on "replacements" and "improvements" were required
to take care of the normal increase of trade,49 that the assets of the
business in 1938 were approximately $94,038.43, and that the business
premises were then subject to a mortgage of $17,500 (which the court
held should have been amortized out of trust corpus 0), there remains
some doubt in my mind whether, had the trustee borrowed the funds,
as suggested by the court, he would have had a going concern for
very long.
It is a deplorable state of affairs when rules of trust administra-
tion make it impossible for a business whose net assets are $100,000,
from which the income beneficiary is receiving, as Mae Thomas was
in this case, an annual return of $32,000, to be continued in that
manner. To secure a $32,000 return invested in normal trust invest-
ments the business would have to have been sold for more than
$640,000 in 1938. This seems unlikely; the whole estate of the
testator, Clay Thomas, was valued at $89,764.90 for inheritance tax
purposes, and this figure, with slight modification, was apparently
accepted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.8
48 93 Ohio App. at 82, 103 N.E.2d at 886.
49 Id. at 39, 103 N.E2d at 867.
50 Id. at 61, 103 N.E.2d at 876-77. This is the accepted rule for mortgages upon
the original trust corpus. Kramer's Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 329 (C.P. 1947) ; 3 ScOTT,
TRuSTS § 233.3, at 1756 (2d ed. 1956). For an interesting recent decision, involving
the application of this rule to a trustee-owned corporation which was dissolved for
tax reasons, see Freeman v. Farmer's Bank & Trust Co., 339 S.W.2d 427 (Ark. 1960).
5193 Ohio App. at 18, 103 N.E.2d at 858.
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C. Origin and Defects of the Traditional Rules
1. Apportionment of Costs Between Legal Life Tenant
and Remainderman
The existing rules of trust law for the administration of physical
assets held in trust were developed as an extension and modification
of rules applicable to the legal life tenant and remainderman in an age
when the economy was largely agrarian and when the most common
physical asset was the mansion house. The rules applicable to the
legal life tenant and remainderman were not well conceived themselves,
and some of this confusion seems to have been projected into the area
of trust administration. Because the legal life tenant was under no
duty to make improvements to the property, the rules concerning
"improvements" came to deal largely with repayment of mortgage
principal and special assessments for municipal improvements." That
is, the rules dealt with "forced" improvements only.
When the legal life tenant was forced to repay the principal of a
mortgage on the property, or when he was forced to pay a special
assessment for municipal improvements, the common law required that
the expenditure be apportioned between the life tenant and remainder-
man."3 The favored formula for apportionment was to require the
life tenant to pay the present worth of the annual interest payments
on the principal expenditure over the remaining period of his life.54
Since the remainderman would pay the balance out of pocket, the rule
was fair only if the value of the improvement at the end of the period
of the life tenant's tenure was at least equal to the total expenditure on
the "improvement." Under the stated rule the remainderman, in
effect, was required to pay out of pocket the present worth of the
principal expenditure to be received at the end of the life tenant's
tenure. If the value received by the remainderman at the end of the
period was less than the principal expenditure, the rule would work to
the financial detriment of the remainderman. Fortunately, in the cases
for which this rule was developed, the value received by the remainder-
man was most likely to be equal to the original expenditure. This
would be so, by definition, in the case of an expenditure for the
repayment of mortgage principal because, regardless of the value of
the property, the added value free of debt would be exactly equal to the
debt removed. The rule as to improvements as between legal life
52 See, e.g., In re Estate of Dailey, 117 Mont. 194, 203-07, 159 P.2d 327, 331-33
(1945) ; Appeal of Datesman, 127 Pa. 348, 359, 17 Atl. 1086, 1087 (1889).
53 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 63, at 89; § 64, at 95-96 (3d ed. 1939).
54In re Estate of Dailey, 117 Mont. 194, 203-04, 159 P.2d 327, 332 (1945);
4 KENT, COMMENTARIES *74-75; 1 STORY, EQuITY § 487 (13th ed. 1886); TnIAi-Y,
REAL PROPERTY § 63 (3d ed. 1939).
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tenant and remainderman also made provision for the case where the
improvement was not likely to outlast the life tenant. In such a case
the life tenant alone was required to bear the cost.55
So far as I have been able to determine, however, no thought
seems to have been given to the case of an improvement which, while
it will outlast the life tenant, is of a character which depreciates in use.
To force the remainderman to contribute out of pocket the present
worth of an improvement which at the end of the period taken in the
calculation of its present worth will be worth less than the principal
sum on which the calculation was based is to deprive the remainderman
of the interest on his contribution. Moreover, if the improvement is
worth less at the end of that period than his contribution at the
beginning, the remainderman has sustained a loss in capital. The
Uniform Principal and Income Act, in an effort to improve upon the
old formula, requires the remainderman to contribute at the begin-
ning of the period the value of the "improvement" at the end of the
period.56 This, of course, still deprives the remainderman of interest
on his contribution.
2. Adaptation to Trust Administration
When this confusion was first contemplated by those who sought
to state a clear rule for trust administration, it seemed to them that its
worst difficulty would automatically be avoided by requiring that all
"improvements" be charged to principal. Since the source of payment
here is a fund to which the remainderman is entitled only in the
future, the objection that he receives no interest is removed. There
remained only the question of improvements which suffer loss in value
through use. This, it was believed, could be handled by requiring the
trustee to "amortize" such improvement out of income over its useful
life.57
It should be noted that even on its own assumptions, all of which
fail miserably when applied to a business, the above rule does not solve
the problem of self-generation of physical assets received in trust. The
amortization permitted under the rule begins only when the "improve-
ment" is made. Thus, if all the assets of the trust wear out and have
to be replaced on the same day, the rule literally requires that the
replacement be charged to a nonexistent corpus and amortized out of a
55 See, e.g., Hitner v. Ege, 23 Pa. 305 (1854).
56 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCoE ACT § 13(2).
57An early case, Plympton v. Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass. 554 (1871), required
the income beneficiary to restore the cost of the improvement through an annual
interest charge. Since the going rate of interest has little, if anything, to do with
rates of wear and tear and obsolescence, there is hardly anything to recommend this
rule.
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nonexistent income. As will be shown, the trust law was forced re-
luctantly to recognize that amortization may start with the assets
received in trust. Recognition of this problem came so late that it was
tacked on, halfheartedly, under the heading "wasting assets," so that
the subject of wear and tear and obsolescence, instead of being treated
under its own proper heading is dealt with under two, one being the
rule as to "improvements" and the other the rule as to "wasting assets."
Since my criticism of the law on this subject is addressed to the
result obtained under these rules, whether taken separately or together,
I prefer to take them separately-just as they present themselves in
the authorities on the subject. The main defense of these rules would
appear to lie in an appeal to certainty and in the claim that they repre-
sent the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Fortunately, it is com-
paratively easy to demonstrate that neither are they very certain in
their application nor do they go back very much further than the
Restatement of Trusts.
3. The Rule That All "Improvements" Must Be Charged to Corpus
a. Modern Expression
The rule as to "improvements" is stated by Professors Bogert 68
and Scott, 9 and is expressed in the Restatement 60 and in the Uniform
Principal and Income Act." However, each of these statements, when
fully developed, contains an element which is not present in the others.
Bogert, 2 Scott,63 and the Restatement 6 draw a distinction be-
tween "permanent" and "temporary" improvements. The Restatement
requires that the cost of improvements which are "not permanent in
character" be paid initially out of corpus, but that the trustee is under
a duty to amortize their cost out of income, "in accordance with such
reasonable plan as he may adopt." 65 According to the Restatement
there should be no amortization of improvements which are "permanent
in character." 66 What is to be understood by the words "improve-
ment" or "permanent in character" is not made clear in the Restate-
5 8 
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 601, at 380 n.27, 381 n.28 (2d ed 1960).
593 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 233.3, at 1759 n.13 (2d ed. 1956).
6o RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 233, comments k, 1 (1959).
6 1 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT § 12 (2).
624 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §803, at 128 (1948).
633 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 233.3, at 1759 n.11 (2d ed. 1956).
6 4 RESTATEMENT (SE OND), TRUSTS § 233, comments k, 7; § 239 (1959).
65 Id. §§ 233, 239.
66 Id. § 233, comment k.
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ment, or indeed anywhere else. But the Restatement regards erection
of buildings as an improvement "permanent in character." 67
The Uniform Principal and Income Act, on the other hand, re-
quires amortization of improvements through a retention out of income
each year of "a sum equal to the cost of the improvement divided by
the number of years of the reasonably expected duration of the im-
provement." '8 This formulation may or may not include the build-
ing which is excluded by the Restatement, since even the most durable
of buildings possesses a "duration." If this is one point of difference
between the Uniform Principal and Income Act and the Restatement,
it introduces a whole congeries of shadowy distinctions. For example,
under the Restatement, improvements upon buildings may not be
amortizable whereas they may be under the act. The reference to
"reasonably expected duration" is unfortunate because it appears to
exclude obsolescence.
Professor Scott's discussion generally mirrors that of the Restate-
ment. But there is one interesting departure. Where Scott speaks
of improvements the cost of which the trustee is required to amortize,
he refers to them as "improvements [which] are not of a permanent
nature . . . especially where the probability is that they will not last
longer than the probable duration of the trust." "
Professor Bogert also makes some reference to "determining
whether the improvement will outlast the life tenant." 70 It is not clear
whether he is speaking of the rule obtaining in connection with legal
life tenant and remainderman or whether he is suggesting a test for
determining whether ati improvement is "permanent" or "temporary"
in the trust context.
As to "temporary" improvements Professor Bogert states that
"the trustee should pay the cost out of income, or if he pays it out of
trust capital the corpus of the trust should be reimbursed from the
income . . . by annual contributions." 71 As we have seen in con-
nection with Holmes v. Hrobon, it makes a good deal of difference
whether "temporary" improvements are to be paid out of corpus in the
first instance or out of income. The matter cannot be treated lightly.
Enough has been said to make the point that if, for some reason,
the case law were to become inaccessible to the student, he would not
67 Ibid.
68UNIF0a PRINCIPAL AND INComE ACT §12(4). This provision was not
included in the act as adopted by Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 3470.1-.13 (Supp. 1960).
693 ScoTt, TRUSTS § 233.3, at 1759 n.13 (2d ed. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
70 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 803, at 128-29 (1948).
71 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTMS §601, at 380 n.27 (2d ed. 1960). (Emphasis
added.)
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be able to tell from the leading texts and principal legislation whether
all improvements must be charged to corpus in the first instance or
whether some-the ones which are to be classified as "temporary"-
may be charged to income. He would not be able to tell what is meant
by "improvements"-for example, whether this also covers replace-
ments. He would not be sure how he is supposed to tell a "per-
manent" improvement from a "temporary" one--whether it be a
distinction drawn in terms of bulk and solidity, in terms of useful
life, in terms of life (whether useful or not), in terms of useful life as
compared with the expected duration of the trust, or in terms acceptable
to accountants.
The cases do not offer much relief in these respects. As we have
seen in Holmes v. Hrobon, no distinction is made in the cases between
"improvements" and "replacements." 72 I believe that we can safely
reject the suggestion contained in Scott and Bogert that in determining
what is a "permanent" improvement we should compare the duration
of the improvement to the duration of the trust.7" The suggestion
represents a confusion with rules applicable to legal life tenant and
remainderman, themselves ill-conceived on this point.74
Putting aside, for the moment, the question of buildings, which
the Restatement treats unequivocally as "permanent," we find that
refrigerators have been held to be permanent improvements 75 and
elevators, curiously enough, to be "temporary." " Boilers and furnaces
have uniformly been treated as permanent.7" But a new roof has been
treated as "temporary." 78 Thus, even if we confine ourselves only to
the more recent cases, it can be seen that the rule as to "improvements"
cannot be regarded as a model of clarity or certainty.
72 See Estate of Roberts, 27 Cal. 2d 70, 79-81, 162 P.2d 461, 467-68 (1945) ; In
the Matter of Trust Estate of Sellers, 31 Del. ChL 158, 173, 67 A.2d 860, 868 (1949) ;
In re Trust of Shurtz, 242 Iowa 448, 454-57, 46 N.W.2d 559, 563-64 (1951) ; In the
Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 552, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542, 553 (Surr. Ct.
1937); Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Reihold, 80 N.E.2d 591, 602 (Ohio P. Ct.
1947).
73 See In the Matter of Trust Estate of Sellers, supra note 72, at 168, 67 A.2d
at 865, where the court referred to the test as the principle of law but apparently
failed to apply it.
74See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
75 Evans v. Ockershausen, 100 F2d 695, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306
U.S. 633 (1939); Hill v. Fill, 57 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1932). Contra, Estate of
Roberts, 27 Cal. 2d 70, 79-81, 162 P.2d 461, 467-68 (1945); In re Bohmert's Will,
10Z N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
78In the Matter of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 557, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542,
558-59 (Surr. Ct 1937); Third Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Reihold, 80 N.E.2d 591,
602 (Ohio P. Ct 1947).
77 In the Matter of Trust Estate of Sellers, 31 Del. Ch. 158, 173, 67 A.2d 860,
868 (1949) ; In re Trust of Shurtz, 242 Iowa 448, 455-56, 46 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1951).
7 8 Estate of Roberts, 27 Cal. 2d 70, 79-81, 162 P.2d 461, 467-68 (1945).
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b. The Early Cases
For the rule that all "improvements" must be charged to corpus
the most miscited early case is Stevens v. Melcher.79 There are, of
course, many earlier cases, but they do not add any refreshing touch
to the problem which concerns us.80 Stevens v. Melcher is of interest
to us because, I believe, it correctly represents the early approach to
the problem.
Paran Stevens died on April 25, 1872. By the fifth clause of his
will he left $1,000,000 in trust to pay the income to his wife for life,
remainder to their children. To the trust the executor allocated an
apartment building valued at $550,000. It was later discovered that
there were latent defects in the building which rendered it unsafe.
These defects were remedied at a cost of $33,707.31. In addition, the
trustees expended $130,000 on a new building. The referee found
that the latter expenditure added $90,000 to the permanent value of
the property and accordingly directed that the sum should be charged
to corpus of the trust, the balance to be paid out of the income. He
directed that the expenditure of $33,707.31 for extraordinary repairs
to the apartment house be charged to corpus. The appellate division
confirmed his report on both these points. The court of appeals
affirmed the decision allocating the expenditure of $130,000 on the new
building, $90,000 to corpus and $40,000 to income,"' but reversed the
decision charging $33,707.31 in respect of extraordinary repairs to
corpus. Instead, it held that this expenditure should be borne by the
executor (before the $1,000,000 trust was constituted)."
The treatment accorded to the expenditure for the new building
hardly supports a hard and fast rule that all "improvements," par-
7980 Hun 514, 30 N.Y. Supp. 625 (App. Div. 1894), modified, 152 N.Y. 551,
46 N.E. 965 (1897).
s0 See, e.g., Abell v. Abell, 75 Md. 44, 64, 23 Atl. 71, 74 (1892); Parsons v.
Winslow, 16 Mass. 361 (1820).
The early English cases are confused because they represent a struggle in the
context of the settlement with the rule applicable to legal life tenant and remainder-
man, which requires all voluntary improvements be paid by the life tenant. In re
Speer's Trusts, 3 Ch. D. 262 (1876); In re Leslie's Settlement, 2 Ch. D. 185 (1876) ;
Drake v. Trefusis, L.R. 10 Ch. 364 (1875); In re Leigh's Estate, L.R. 6 Gb. 886
(1871) ; Dent v. Dent, 30 Beav. 363, 54 Eng. Rep. 929 (Ch. 1862) ; Dunne v. Dunne,
3 Sm. & G. 22, 65 Eng. Rep. 546 (Ch. 1855); Caldecott v. Brown, 2 Hare 144, 67
Eng. Rep. 60 (Ch. 1842); Hibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim. & St. 552, 57 Eng. Rep. 218
(Ch. 1824). In fact, the Settled Land Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. 18, c. 38, § 26, first
clearly allowed improvements to be charged to corpus. "[Tihe leading purpose of
the Legislature was to prevent the decay of agricultural and other interests occa-
sioned by the deterioration of lands and buildings in the possession of irpecunous
life-tenants." Bruce v. Marquess of Ailsbury, [1892] A.C. 356, 363. It is interesting
to reflect that by virtue of the rule first dearly sanctioned by that act, we are now
facing the reverse problem, namely, the deterioration of a business in the possession
of an opulent life tenant.
81152 N.Y. at 571-72, 46 N.E. at 969-70.
82 Id. at 575, 46 N.E. at 971.
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ticularly buildings, must be charged to corpus. The court of appeals
noted that erection of this building would substantially enhance income,
and the allocation of the cost was sustained on the equitable basis that
the permanent value of the buildings would be no more than $90,000.
The approach which weighs the increase in the income against the
ultimate benefit to be derived by the remainderman is found in a num-
ber of the early cases.'
The most interesting aspect of the case is the citation by the appel-
late division to Ferguson v. Ferguson.4  In that case, trustees ex-
pended £2,914, 9s, 10d for the completion of rental cottages left un-
finished by the testator. Because it was not feasible to charge corpus
with this expenditure, the court ordered that the expense be paid by
the income beneficiaries. The court ordered, further, that the income
beneficiaries should have a lien against the corpus of the trust for the
repayment of their advance, and, having found the useful life of the
cottages to be forty years, the court ordered that this lien be reduced
annually by £58, 5s, 9d, or one-fortieth of the principal expenditure 5
It is fascinating to find at least one case which supports the modified
version of the method used by the trustee in Holmes v. Hrobon.0
In New York, the Restatement rule charging all "improvements"
to corpus and amortizing "temporary" improvements out of income
was not established until 1942, and then only by reference to the
Restatement itself.8 7 Before 1942 the uniform rule was that "those
who receive the benefit must pay the cost." 88 I do not wish to be
taken as favoring a return to the rule of Stevens v. Mel cher, or
Ferguson v. Ferguson, which would cause income to contribute to
improvements, in lump sum, an amount which is fair, taking into
account the increased income, the availability of other sources, and
the benefit conferred on the remainderman. On the contrary, I point
to those cases only for two salutary principles: (1) that in arriving
at the figure which should be contributed by income we consider the
benefits derived by the income beneficiary and compare them with the
benefits derived by the remainderman; (2) that in determining how
the contribution is to be made (and I am certainly in favor of spread-
88 See Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337, 342-43, 78 N.E. 459, 460 (1906) ; Little
v. Little, 161 Mass. 188, 202, 36 N.E. 795, 796 (1894) ; Hudson County Nat'l Bank v.
Woodruff, 122 NJ. Eq. 444, 451, 194 Atl. 266, 270 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937).
8417 L.R. Ir. 552 (Ch. 1886).
85 Id. at 580-81.
86 See p. 518 suPra.
8 In the Matter of Estate of del Drago, 179 Misc. 383, 389, 36 N.Y.S.2d 811,
819 (Surn. Ct. 1942).
88 Matter of Parr, 45 Misc. 564, 568, 92 N.Y. Supp. 990, 992 (Surr. Ct. 1904),
aff'd inern., 113 App. Div. 921, 100 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (1906), citing Stevens v. Melcher,
80 Hun 514, 30 N.Y. Supp. 625 (App. Div. 1894), modified, 152 N.Y. 551, 46 N.E.
965 (1897).
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ing it to avoid violent fluctuations in the income beneficiary's return),
we consider whether the scheme is workable.
4. Operation of a Business Under the "Wasting Assets" Rule
The rule concerning improvements favored by all the authorities
is plainly unworkable because it does not come into operation until an
"improvement" is made. A trustee who is directed to retain a group
of business assets for the production of income can take little comfort
from the proposition that when these assets need to be replaced he
can thereafter regenerate the process by amortization against income.8 9
The curious approach of trust law to this problem is evidenced by
the fact that there is no discussion in the leading texts under the head-
ing "Depreciation." Professor Scott, for example, states under the
heading "Repairs and Improvements" that reserves out of income for
future improvements are not favored "since this would be unfair to the
income beneficiary, who would obtain no advantage from the improve-
ments . . *.." 1o Under the heading "Wasting Property" he states
that reserves for depreciation are sanctioned in trust law for "wasting
assets" which include machinery and farm implements, but he cites
no authorities.9 ' In fact, the rule as to wasting assets did not, until
the Restatement made it do so, sanction "amortization."
Confined to the type of assets with which we are concerned-
personal property or fixtures which depreciate in use-the rule, always
based on the presumed intention of the testator, had two aspects: (1)
If the asset was specifically bequeathed in legal life tenancy and re-
mainder, or if it was bequeathed as a gift of residue but there appeared
an intention on the part of the testator that the asset was to be retained
and enjoyed in specie by the life tenant, the legal life tenant was en-
titled to its full enjoyment and to all of its income, and he was not
accountable to the remainderman for the normal depreciation or con-
sumption of the asset. 2  (2) If the asset was bequeathed as part of
a gift of the residue without an intention of the testator that it be en-
joyed in specie, the doctrine of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth " required
that the asset be sold and the proceeds reinvested in safe investments
for the benefit of life tenant and remainderman. The corollary of the
89 See pp. 523-24 supra.
9O 3 Scowt, TRUSTS § 233.3, at 1761 (2d ed. 1956).
91 Id. § 239, at 1857.
92As to specific bequests, see Christley's Ex'r v. Meddis, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.)
35 (1845); Healey v. oppan, 45 N.H. 243 (1864) ; Spear v. Tinkldam, 2 Barb. Ch.211 (N.Y. 1847); Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Ch. 370 (S.C. Ct. App. 1833). As to
residue, see Holman's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174 (1854) ; Alcock v. Sloper, 2 My. & K. 699,
39 Eng. Rep. 1111 (Ch. 1833).
93 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (CI. 1802).
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doctrine was that if the sale of the asset was delayed, the legal life
tenant was entitled only to a return equal to that which he would
have enjoyed had the asset been so sold and reinvested? 4 These rules
were faithfully followed by the courts in the context of equitable life
tenancies and remainders under a trust. 5 The only aspect of the rules
which supports something resembling "amortization" is the corollary
of the doctrine in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, but this is hardly the
same thing as the "amortization" sanctioned in the Restatement.
The rate of return measuring the right of the income beneficiary
under the English rule was three per cent,"6 while the American cases
support variously four to six per cent.97  The choice of the rate is de-
pendent upon what is regarded as "the usual rate of income upon a safe
investment." " A "safe investment" in a business enterprise produces
the return it produces because someone is making the investment safe
by holding back, out of the profits, considerably more than the original
cost of the assets committed to the enterprise. Therefore, the corollary
of the rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth is not the same thing as a
depreciation reserve on the assets.
It is well settled that, in the absence of testamentary or statutory
authorization to continue a decedent's business,99 the executor or
trustee is under a duty to sell, the business being regarded as a "wasting
asset." 100 If the sale is delayed for some unavoidable reason, the
early cases all apply the corollary of the doctrine of Howe v. Earl of
94 Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 III. 437, 453, 27 N.E. 65, 67 (1891) ; Mudge v.
Parker, 139 Mass. 153, 154, 29 N.E. 543 (1885); Westcott v. Nicherson, 120 Mass.
410 (1876); Kinmonth v. Bingham, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 270, 276 (1862); Cairns v.
Chaubert, 9 Paige 159, 162-63 (N.Y. Ch. 1841); Matter of Miller, 64 Misc. 232, 240,
119 N.Y. Supp. 52, 57 (Surr. Ct. 1909), affd per curiam, 138 App. Div. 885, 122
N.Y. Supp. 1136, aff'd wnem., 199 N.Y. 564, 93 N.E. 1124 (1910).
95 Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493 (1931); Knox's Estate, 328
Pa. 177, 183-84, 195 Aft. 28, 31-32 (1937); Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R.I.
363, 375-76, 190 Atl. 32, 36-37 (1937) ; Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 135, 191
S.W.2d 176, 179 (1945); McFadden v. Blair, 42 Tenn. App. 435, 304 S.W.2d 93
(1956).
96 See, e.g., In re Claytor, [1905] 1 Ch. 233. Four per cent for war and post-
World War I years, In re Parry, [1947] Ch. 23; In re Beech, [1920] 1 Ch. 40.
97 See Kinmonth v. Bingham, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 270, 280 (6%); Matter of
Miller, 64 Misc. 232, 240, 119 N.Y. Supp. 52, 57 (Surr. Ct. 1909), aff'd per curiam,
138 App. Div. 885, 122 N.Y. Supp. 1136, aff'd mnem., 199 N.Y. 564, 93 N.E. 1124
(1910) (4%). The UNIFom PRINCIPAL AND INcoMm ACT § 10 sets 5%. This
section was deleted in the 1947 revision of the Pennsylvania act. The commissioners'
comment states that the section, whose application turned on whether there was a
duty to convert, was difficult to apply and that the matter is best left to the existing
case law.
9s Kinmonth v. Bingham, m.pra note 97, at 278.
99 3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 230.4 (2d ed. 1956).
100 Moran's Estate, 261 Pa. 269, 104 At. 285 (1918); see ATKINSOx, WLs
§§ 121-22 (2d ed. 1953); cf. Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa. 36, 156 Atl. 309 (1931). The
rule extends to controlling interests in a closely held corporation. SLmis & FRATc an,
CAsEs ON FIDuciARY ADmINISTRATION 317 (1956).
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Dartmouth to the receipts from the business. 01- In fact, for assets such
as "machinery and farm implements" only one case has been found to
support the "amortization" method of the Restatement.02 The Uni-
form Principal and Income Act, it may be noted, faithfully renders the
common-law rule in section 10. Except for the enigmatic provision of
section 7, relating to businesses, there is nothing in the act supporting
depreciation on original assets, whether "wasting" or otherwise. As to
businesses, the old cases are clear that they must be sold, unless a
different intention appears; that if sale is delayed, the current bene-
ficiary is entitled to no more than the normal rate of return on "safe
investments"; and that if an intention appears that the business be
retained, the settlor is presumed to have intended that all of the profits
be distributed to the current income beneficiary. There is no room in
this structure for depreciation reserves, and there was no case support-
ing them until quite recently.
This history accounts for the fact that Professor Scott states, on
the one hand, that depreciation reserves on original assets are frowned
upon and, on the other, that amortization of "wasting assets" is re-
quired and that wasting assets include "farm implements and ma-
chinery" but not buildings.
It is believed, therefore, that when accounting for depreciation
became better understood and the need for it on original assets became
evident, the subject was tacked on for lack of a better place under the
heading "wasting assets." The process involved, among other things,
a misinterpretation of the corollary to the doctrine in Howe v. Earl of
Dartmouth. That corollary, I believe, contains the seeds of a sound
solution to the administration of businesses in trust. But the develop-
ment of this point must be left until later. Meanwhile, the energies
of trustmen have been channelled to developing, under the heading
"wasting assets," a rule which would allow for cost or inventory value
depreciation. The process has been hampered by the fact that the
older cases, whenever an intention to retain such assets appeared, re-
garded this as an indication that all of the profits thereof should go
to the current income beneficiary.
10, See cases cited note 94 supra. Professor Bogert refers to these cases for the
proposition that "a portion of the current income should be amortized to be added
to capital unless the instrument otherwise directs so as to maintain the orighal dollar
value of the capital." 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS.& TRUSTEES § 832, at 323 (1948). (Emphasis
added and footnotes omitted.) Maintaining the original dollar value of the capital,
which is the effect of depreciation on trust inventory value, is not the same thing as
what these cases require. See McFadden v. Blair, 42 Tenn. App. 434, 304 S.W.2d 93
(1956), for a collection of cases.
102 Matter of Housman, 4 Den. 404, 414 (N.Y. Surr. Ct 1886). Actually, the
court applied the older equitable principle discussed in connection with "improve-
nments" that the life tenant must contribute a reserve which is justified by the degree
to which these assets increase the income of the estate.
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In the case of buildings, moreover, there has always existed a
feeling on the part of the judiciary that any loss in value is purely
theoretical. 113  In a period of rising land values and inflation such loss
may continue to impress the courts as being theoretical until shortly
before the building collapses. In any case, depreciation on buildings
held in trust has been uniformly disapproved.'04 The rule has intruded
itself upon real estate corporations held in trust." 5 As to depreciation
of other assets, the indications are inauspicous. °8
Fortunately, in the area of our main concern, we can point to
the present enigmatic provision of section 7 of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act,' which would appear to permit depreciation in the
case of business assets held in trust. Whether the provision would
be sufficiently potent to modify the general reluctance to approve de-
preciation on buildings remains open to question. One of the earliest
cases permitting depreciation on business assets confined itself to per-
sonal property.' Two recent cases, however, taking a bold step for-
ward, approve depreciation on all depreciable business assets.0 9 More-
over, the Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act would require
trustees to set up reserves on all depreciable assets."'
The adoption of such a provision or the universal recognition of
the position taken in the two cases just mentioned would certainly
render redundant the treatment of wear and tear in the context of a
business held in trust under the existing two headings, "improve-
ments" and "wasting assets." But it would not render redundant the
103 See Matter of Fifth Madison Corp., 297 N.Y. 155, 161-62, 77 N.E.2d 134, 136
(1948). Compare North Carolina Midland Ry. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 610,
612 (Ct Cl. 1958) (on effects of obsolescence).
104 For a collection of authorities and criticism, see Copron, Reserves Against
the Depreciation of Real Property Held by a Trustee, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 (1951);
Propp, Depreciation of Buildings Held in Testamentary Trusts, 19 N.Y. CERT. PUB.
ACCOUNTANT 170 (1949).
105 In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951) ; In the Matter
of Estate of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 556, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542, 558 (Surr. Ct 1937).
But see In the Matter of City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 306 N.Y. 733, 117 N.E.2d
910 (1954).
'06 See In the Matter of Estate of Adler, supra note 105 (denying depreciation
on an elevator) ; Matter of Chapman, 32 Misc. 187, 66 N.Y. Supp. 235 (Surr. Ct.
1900), aff'd, 59 App. Div. 624, 69 N.Y. Supp. 1131, aff'd, 167 N.Y. 619, 60 N.E. 1108
(1901) (denying depreciation on a ferryboat).
107 See pp. 511-13 supra.
108 In the Matter of Jones, 103 N.Y. 621, 624, 9 N.E. 493, 495 (1886).
1o9 Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); In re Trust Created by
Will of Bailey, 241 Minn. 143, 62 N.W.2d 829 (1954). These cases rest heavily on
settlor's intent and broad discretionary clauses. Re Robertson, [1951] Ont. 309, 312,
317-19, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 241, 244, 249-51, contains the best statement of the reasons
for depreciation (2Y2% on building). But see Holmes v. Hrobon, 93 Ohio App. 1,
82-83, 103 N.E.2d 845, 886 (1951), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 158 Ohio St. 508, 110
N.E.2d 574 (1953).
110 UNIFORM REVISED PRIcnAL AND INCOME ACT § 11(1) (b) (Tent Draft No. 2,
1961).
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lessons to be learned from the development which caused the subject
to be so mistreated. Nor would it solve the problem discussed in this
article.
5. The Inadequacy of a Rule Allowing Reserves
for Depreciation Based on Original Cost
Had the benefit of this recent trend been available to the trustee
in Holmes v. Hrobon, the Atlas business entrusted to his care would
have been destroyed less rapidly but as decisively as it would had the
decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals been permitted to stand."'
The trustee started in 1938 with plant and equipment valued at
approximately $74,000. Part of this figure represents building and
land. The trustee did not replace the building. Assuming therefore
that the land and building account for $20,000 of this figure (it should
be recalled that there was a $17,500 mortgage on these), the trustee's
reserves for depreciation would have to have started from a base of
$54,000. Even if it had been depreciated and replaced twice over
between 1938 and 1946, this would account for only $108,000 in re-
placements. The trustees, in fact, expended $140,000 on "replace-
ments." The discrepancy between this figure and the opening entry
for plant and equipment must be based on two factors. The testator,
Clay Thomas, made no provision on the books of the business for de-
preciation. At his death he had assets, in addition to the business,
sufficient to pay $55,000 in pecuniary legacies. Assuming, for the sake
of argument, that these assets represented the reserve he failed to set
up on the books of his business, it is possible that the replaced assets
cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $110,000. The difference
between this figure and the cost of replacement may be due to the
fact that between 1938 and 1946 the increase in cost of wholesale
commodities was 54%.112
In other words, if the testator had made provision for depreciation
based on original cost and the trustee had continued this practice, the
reserves thus established would not have been sufficient to absorb the
replacements because of the intervening drop in the purchasing power
of the dollar. Moreover, the trustee also expended $61,792.13 on
"additions" and, so far as we can tell, $100,000 on competing busi-
nesses. These sums could not have been produced by a reserve for
depreciation. The Ohio Court of Appeals, it is true, held that the
11I The court of appeals catagorically denied the trustee's right to set up reserves
for depredation. 93 Ohio App. 1, 82-83, 103 N.E.2d 845, 886 (1951).
112 The Bureau of Labor Statistics figures show that the wholesale price index
rose from 51.1 in 1938 to 78.7 in 1946. See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DE 'T OF
CoMIMRcE, STATISTCAL A3STRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1961, at 329.
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trustee exceeded his authority in purchasing the competing businesses.
But it did not address itself to the question whether the Atlas business
could have been operated profitably without this move.
I do not think that it requires demonstration that the trustee did
an excellent job. Unquestionably he could not have done it under the
existing rules of trust administration, even as modified by soothing
references to "accepted accounting practices." The most these prac-
tices would allow are reserves for depreciation based on original cost.
The begrudging recognition given to such practices in the law of trusts
suggests that the trustee at best may expect to receive approval for
depreciation on long-drawn-out straight-line schedules. On this basis,
the twin factors of rising prices and obsolescence will alone create a
financial crisis for the trustee. To keep the business afloat in the face
of these factors and in the face of competition, the traditional trust
law provides two solutions, one of which is more or less unworkable
and both of which are unsound.
The trustee may be authorized to borrow. As we have seen, the
system devised for him, whether it be called depreciation or amortiza-
tion of "improvements," will not put him in funds sufficiently quickly
to meet the normal schedules of repayment.
The trustee may be furnished-by a far-sighted estate planner-
with substantial additional assets which he may invade when necessary
to the operation of the business. There are indications that, at com-
mon law, an express direction contained in the will to continue the
decedent's business did not empower the executor or trustee to venture
any other assets of the estate.'13 If this position had been clearly ad-
hered to,"14 more, if estate planners had been expressly prohibited from
providing for the invasion of other trust assets to sustain the operations
of the business, the results would be unsatisfactory but infinitely better
than the results obtained under the existing law. As it is, well-informed
trustees will insist on a clause which permits them to use the general
assets of the trust for purposes of the business."
5
It is at this point that the solution of the Restatement and other
authorities, which require that all "improvements" be charged to
corpus and that some-the ones classified as "temporary"-be amor-
tized out of income, takes on a sinister and fallacious hue. The effect
113 Willis v. Sharp, 113 N.Y. 586, 21 N.E. 705 (1889) ; In the Matter of Kohler's
Will, 193 App. Div. 8, 24, 183 N.Y. Supp. 550, 562 (1920), rev'd on other gromus,
231 N.Y. 353, 132 N.E. 114 (1921); Hake v. Dilworth, 96 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936) ; cf. Sulzer's Estate, 323 Pa. 1, 7, 185 At. 793, 795 (1936).
114 Compare Sulzer's Estate, supra note 113, at 7, 185 At. at 795; Parry's
Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 At. 443 (1914).
115 TRUST Div., AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, HANDLING BUSINESSES IN TRUST
app. B, at 87 (1959); Golden, Perpetuating Family Business Through Estate Plan-
ning, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 906, 918 (1960) (regards this as "doubtful wisdom").
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on a very profitable, well-managed business which has not been pro-
vided with additional working capital has its perfect illustration in
Holmes v. Hrobon. Its effect is to stifle and destroy the business.
But it is its effect on a less profitable and possibly mismanaged
business whose trustee has been furnished with substantial "working
capital" by a provident estate planner which is particularly deplorable.
Let us assume, for example, that the Atlas business came into the
hands of the trustee with equipment and machinery valued at $100,000
in 1938. Let us assume that the trustee was expressly authorized to
set up reserves for depreciation and was furnished, in addition, with a
well-diversified portfolio of securities valued at $50,000 in 1938. Let
us assume further that the trust instrument directed the trustee to con-
tinue the business for the benefit of the widow and then to transfer the
business to a son (then in high school) with the expressly stated hope
that the son become interested in and continue the family business.
Under the existing rules of trust administration the trustee would
have paid to the widow approximately $45,000 annually during the
years 1938-1946. This figure may be obtained as follows: The trustee
completely depreciated and replaced the machinery received in 1938
and this depreciation reserve, together with the salvage value of the
old machinery, contributed $120,000 to the replacement of the new.
The replacements cost $140,000 because of the rise in price levels ex-
perienced between 1938 and 1946. But since the reserve for de-
preciation will benefit somewhat from the inflation if placed in shares
of stock, and since the salvage value of the machines may also increase,
we have assumed that only $20,000 of this replacement cost would be
unaccounted for. Moreover, it should be remembered that the re-
placements were not all made in the last year of a period over which
price levels rose 54%. The extra $20,000 was charged to corpus-
to the securities which by that time had increased in value, let us
assume, to $80,000. The trustee also charged approximately $60,000
for "additions" to these securities. In the actual case, the trustee
charged replacements and additions costing approximately $200,000
to current income. He also charged the cost of purchasing the com-
peting businesses to income, but since the Ohio Court of Appeals held
that this was not authorized, 16 let us eliminate this purchase and also
the income which was used for this purpose. The Atlas business, we
know, paid to the widow approximately $250,000. If we eliminate
its purchase of competing businesses and the income used in that pur-
chase, it is not unlikely that the income of the business would have
been $450,000 during the period 1938-1946. In our hypothetical case,
116 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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the trustee may have retained approximately $90,000 as a reserve for
depreciation on the original machinery (assuming a $10,000 salvage
value); the balance would have been paid out as income to the widow.
This is $45,000 annually.
• I In liquidating $20,000 of the securities to pay for the inflationary
increase in the cost of the machinery, the trustee, in effect, distributed
capital to the widow. It might be objected that if the trustee continues
to depreciate the new machinery, the dollar amount of this expenditure
will be preserved- for the remainderman and that the courts have not
recognized that the remainderman is entitled to demand that the
trustee protect him against inflation."' But the fact remains that if
the trustee had kept the $20,000 in a reasonably diversified portfolio
the remainderman would have been protected. However, this is not
the important objection to the trustee's action in respect of the
$20,000. The important objection is that the next eight-year period,
1946-1954, saw a 29% increase in cost of wholesale commodities."'
But the trustee had exhausted the fund against which further replace-
ments might have been charged. He had liquidated all the additional
securities given to him.
The objection to invading corpus for the purpose of keeping up
with rising price levels, in a business which can easily make provision
for its own replacements out of its own income, is that ultimately the
.additional fund must be exhausted and if, at that point, trust
law still denies the trustee's right to make provision for replacements
out of income, the business will have to look to outside financing-
which brings us back to the first unworkable solution.
Moreover, like any other business, the Atlas business needed
"additions," and it is surely no surprise that it needed to meet or elim-
inate competition. It could, as the trustee demonstrated in the actual
case, have made provision for these needs and still paid $32,000 an-
nually to the widow. But under the existing rule the trustee would be
required to invade whatever additional corpus he is fortunate to receive
in order to keep up with these needs. All the while, he is converting
securities which carry a return of 4Y to 5 7, to the income beneficiary
into business assets which carry fantastic returns but which involve
greater risk and suffer the ravages of inflation and obsolescence.
But there is a more fundamental objection to the encouragement
which the rules of trust administration lend to the process above de-
scribed. The Atlas business was extremely well managed and ex-
tremely profitable. Suppose that the business produced, income which,
117 See pp. 512-15 supra. ,
118 See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,. STATISTICAL AB-
sTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1961,'at 329 (1946: 78.7; "19544103.3)." i ",
1962] TRUSTEE-CONTROLLED BUSINESS'ENTERPRISE 537
if the business were required to bear the cost of its own survival,
would result in a net return on the investment of 1%. The existing
rule of trust administration would too long delay the discovery of this
fact if the trustee is permitted to liquidate securities to pay for the
replacements and additions needed in -the business and distribute the
business income which should have been used for this purpose. A
business with an investment of $100,000, which should retain $9,000
per annum to pay a return of $1,000, can be made to look good by
charging the $9,000 to the corpus of the trust, thus converting a re-
turn of $1,400 ($1,000 on a provident business, and $400 on $9,000
in securities) into a return of $10,000 on the "improvement."
While I do not suggest that any trustee would be guilty of such
mismanagement, nevertheless, with less extreme figures the nature
of the process may be less obvious. And the process itself is decisively
encouraged by the existing rules of trust administration concerning
"improvements." The existing rules of trust administration, in refus-
ing to allow--or better, to require-the trustee to make provision for
replacements and necessary improvements in the business out of the
business income, are unsound because they would destroy a profitable
business where no additional assets are furnished the trustee and sus-
tain a poor business where such assets are furnished.
D. The Making of a Sound Rule
The decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Holmes v. Hrobon,
reversing in part the court of appeals decision, is perhaps one of the
most underestimated developments in the area of trust administration
since the Statute of Uses. On the essential point of trust administra-
tion, the court held as follows:
Giving full consideration to the desire of the testator
that the Atlas business be continued, the history of its past
operation, the fact that it had always been operated and ex-
panded out of earnings, the complete lack of capital with
which the trustee could operate, the amount of profits realized
from the business during the latter years of operation by the
testator and the impossibility of operation by the trustee
without using a portion of the income as capital, we con-
clude that it was the intention of the testator to and he did
authorize the use by the trustee of income in the operation
and expansion of Atlas, even though such use reduced the
amount of profits currently available for payment to the
widow. The right of the trustee to so use income would
exist only so long as the business was operated profitably and
the widow received a reasonable amount of the income.
119
119 158 Ohio St. 508, 520-21, 110 N.E.2d 574, 582 (195.3).,
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While the court emphasized what it found to be the intention
of the testator, it is my contention that the normal rule for adminis-
tration of businesses in trust should be substantially the one which
the testator was said to have intended in this case. In the preceding
discussion I have attempted to state a number of reasons which have
brought me to the point of urging a clear and unequivocal adoption
of such a rule.
Rules of trust administration, it is true, do not belong to a sector
of the law in which those to whom it applies may be said to have had
no opportunity to fashion the results. Nevertheless, the law's own
plan for the administration of estates must be one which does least
damage to the normal interests of those who fail to fashion a plan
of their own. My conclusion rests partly on the points already
labored-that the plan now existing is unsound in a practical sense and
disappoints the expectations of decedents who, unfortunately, are not
in a position to register this fact. My argument, however, does not
rest simply on a concern for the improvident. The provident also are
not well served by the plan. In urging a clear-cut recognition of a
new rule, I am not insensitive to the concern of those who regard the
law of trust administration as a set of rules designed primarily to hold
in check the incompetent and fraudulent trustee. I suspect, however,
that this concern belongs to an era which has long passed and that its
strength, sustained by careful choice of teaching materials, is interfer-
ing unreasonably with the proper development of the law. In any case,
the rule for which I am arguing will, I believe, meet all the requirements
born of caution and suspicion.
While the Supreme Court of Ohio suggested, in broad terms, the
rule which should obtain in the administration of businesses held in
trust, it subjected this to a qualification in detail which, on reflection,
should be rejected. The trustee was ordered to set up on his trust
accounts a figure representing the net assets of the trust existing at
the inception of the trust-an "intact value." The court stated:
The books of account must be so kept that annual state-
ments will reflect the total net assets of the trust and reflect
both the unchanging value of the corpus and the additional
capital resulting from expenditure of income. It would seem
obvious that at any given time the latter element of capital,
to wit, the amount thereof resulting from investment of in-
come, will be the difference between the total net assets and
the original and unchanged value of the corpus.
120
The court declared that when the business is sold or the trust
terminates, the widow or her estate will be'entitled to this difference.
=o ld. at 573, 110 N.E.2d at 583."
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The scheme approved by the court should be compared with the modi-
fied version of the trustee's method of accounting discussed earlier.12'
Under that version, the corpus is allowed to keep investments of in-
come which represent replacements at increasing costs. The income
beneficiary is entitled only to the depreciated worth of additions. But
that method is not urged as a solution here because it suffers from most
of the defects which make the "intact value" method unacceptable. It
is an improvement over the "intact value" method only to the extent
that it does not distribute to the current income beneficiary all in-
flationary increases in the cost of replacements, all increases in market
value not due to reinvestment of income, and the value of intangibles
such as good will. The court made no attempt to meet the question
of intangible worth, stating that the allocation of this would have to
be determined when the distribution occurs. 2
In theory, the court's decision differs little from the Pennsylvania
apportionment rule applied to corporate distributions. There has
been growing dissatisfaction with the rule with the result that juris-
dictions originally adhering to it have one by one abandoned it. 2 3 The
rule is based on the idea that the current income beneficiary of a trust
holding shares of a corporation has an equitable claim to his propor-
tionate share of the undistributed earnings accumulated since the
inception of the trust. This claim, it is recognized, remains inchoate
until the corporation or the trustee makes some move which would
deprive the current income beneficiary of the possibility of receiving
undistributed earnings by way of cash dividend. One such move, for
example, is the declaration by the corporation of a stock dividend.
To protect the income beneficiary against the supposed loss of his
interest in the earnings capitalized to support a stock dividend, the rule
requires calculations which would baffle an electronic computer. In-
variably, their result is to secure to the corpus beneficiaries no more
than the original dollar value of the corporate investment. Because book
values are used liberally and thoughtlessly, the inevitable consequence
of the computations, if expressed in terms of market values, is to confer
upon the current income beneficiary a windfall and to inflict upon the
corpus a substantial loss. 24
121P. 518 supra.
12 158 Ohio St at 523, 110 N.E.2d at 583.
123 See Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Appor-
tionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 157 (1957); Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham and Chaos, 98 TRusTs & ESTATES 924
(1959).
12 4 For example, in Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, 220 Md.
275, 152 A.2d 184 (1959), through the application of the rule, the income beneficiary
received shares with a total market value of $68,250, although only $8.75 per share,
representing $8,750 for the trust's 1,000 shares, had been transferred from earned
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In a recent Maryland case,12 5 the trustee argued vainly that the
income beneficiary was entitled to no more of the dividend shares than
are necessary to reflect, at current market values, the amount of the
transfer from earned surplus to capital account in respect of such
shares. Alternatively, he argued that in determining whether corpus
has suffered by reason of the dividend, the original dollar value of the
corporate stock held by the trustee (in this case the 1915 value) must
be adjusted by means of an appropriate price index.
It is this last argument, rejected by the court, which touches on
the fundamental fallacy of the rule. By it, the trustee sought to secure
recognition of the fact that, under accepted accounting practices, it is
difficult to say how much of the surplus is tied up in replacements at
constantly increasing costs. Furthermore, surplus is the business com-
munity's solution to the fact that accountants do not purport to measure
funds necessary for preserving the relative competitive position of the
enterprise. How much of any given surplus represents income which
could be distributed without impairment of the going nature of the
enterprise cannot easily be determined.
A greater understanding of these factors has worked a change in
the arguments advanced against the Pennsylvania apportionment rule.
While early dissatisfaction with the rule centered on its complexities and
the resulting cost of administration, the more recent attacks have cen-
tered on its basic unfairness. The presumptions that the testator in-
tended the current income beneficiary to receive all of the income of a
going enterprise has become untenable in the modem economy.12 6  It is
no longer possible to visualize a tolerably well-informed testator expect-
ing a company to remain operative in an inflationary and competitive
economy without a surplus. It is, therefore, impossible to attribute to
him, without more, an intention to make that surplus available to the
current income beneficiary.
surplus to the capital account In contrast, the corpus suffered a net loss in market
value of $76,250 through the court's contenting itself with maintaining the intact
value of the 1,000 shares-based on their stated value in 1915, when the trust was
created.
'
2 5 Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, supra note 124.
126 See Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 11-13, 149 A.2d 72, 78-79 (1959):
Present day economic conditions, particularly in the corporate field, pre-
sent a drastic contrast to the economic conditions in existence at the inception
of and during the formative years of the Rule . . . . The sole justification
for [the rule] . . . must rest upon the theory that that which corporate
management labels as reinvested earnings, earnings, earned surplus, etc., is
actually corporate income which has been. earmarked and set aside solely for
eventual distribution to the shareholders. Under modern corporate methods,
however, such accounts may. be and are set up for various and sundry reasons,
for example, to cover future expansion, cost of equipment, future contingencies
or reserves for losses in business, etc. and that which is labelled "earnings"
may. and often does represent items other than income, such as capital gains.
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I have stressed the progress of this consideration because it seems
to me that if it plays a part in the movement away from the Penn-
sylvania rule, its force is infinitely greater in the context of a rule
which affects directly the conduct of a business. In short, if the argu-
ment against the Pennsylvania rule is that it imputes to the testator
an intention consistent only with the theoretical destruction of a busi-
ness-theoretical because such apportionments do not interfere with the
conduct of a corporation-it is even more persuasive against the rule
adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Holmes v. Hrobon.
III. ESTATE AND TAX PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
This solution to the problem of financing the operation and sur-
vival of a business-allowing the trustee to use current income, when
necessary, but requiring him ultimately to distribute to the current in-
come beneficiary or his estate the difference between the "intact value"
of the business when received in trust and the proceeds of sale or the
value of the business at the time of such distribution-must be re-
jected.-2 It creates, in the name of dubious considerations of equity,
a situation which is unsound from the tax viewpoint.
A. ,The Tax Situation
If the underlying law of trust administration frankly acknowledges
that income used for the necessary restoration and improvement of the
productive facilities of a business held in trust must ultimately be ac-
counted for to the current income beneficiary, it would seem clear that
the trust must be classified as a "complex" trust for federal income tax
purposes. "Complex" trusts, as they are fondly called by students
of the subject, are all those trusts which do not qualify for treatment
under subpart B of subchapter J, relating to what are over-optimis-
tically called "simple" trusts.
In order to determine whether a trust is "simple" or "complex,"
the relevant test for our purposes is whether it provides for the dis-
tribution of all its income currently; "I and "income," for this purpose,
is income as determined under the governing instrument or the appli-
cable local law."2
Mindful of the fact that reference to "the governing instrument"
might permit settlors to escape the unfavorable rules applicable to
"complex" trusts, the regulations provide that "trust provisions which
12 7 Besides Holmes v. Hrobon, Weschler's Estate, 212 Pa. 508, 61 AUt. 1091
(1905), is the only case found to support the "intact value' approach.
1
2 8 See INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 651.
19 INT.'REV. CODE oF 1954, § 643 (b).
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depart fundamentally from concepts of local law in the determination
of what constitutes income are not recognized for this purpose." IS0
We shall shortly consider the question how far the "local law" could
shift the existing lines drawn between "principal" and "income" with-
out objection that it has overstepped the tolerance of the congressional
reference to local law.
The "intact value" solution of the Ohio Supreme Court, however,
recognizes that sums reinvested out of current income for necessary
replacement, renovation, and improvement of business assets do not
lose their essential characteristic as "income" under local law. A trust
treated to this rule, therefore, is clearly a "complex" one. This will
cause problems when the business is sold and the trustee distributes to
the current income beneficiary the difference between the net proceeds
of sale and the "intact value" of the business. The distribution, under
the pass-through provisions of the 1954 Code, will be taxed to the
current income beneficiary to the extent that the trust had "dis-
tributable net income" in the year of distribution.131
"Distributable net income" is defined in section 643(a) as "the
taxable income of the . . . trust," computed with certain modifications.
One of the modifications is that capital gains "shall be excluded to the
extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not (A) paid,
credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during the
taxable year . ... ," " The first serious tax problem posed by the
"intact value" solution is whether the capital gains realized on the sale
of the business are or are not "paid, credited or required to be dis-
tributed" within the meaning of this provision. For example, let us
suppose that the "intact value" of the business was $100,000. The
business was sold for $200,000, which resulted in ordinary income to
the trust of $50,000 and capital gain of $50,000. The trustee dis-
tributes $100,000 to the current income beneficiary. It is clear that to
the extent that the $50,000 ordinary income of the trust was "taxable
income" of the trust, the distribution to the beneficiary will be taxed
to him as ordinary income. The question is whether the additional
distribution of $50,000 represents the capital gain or something else.
On this question there exists considerable doubt. 3
The regulations state that capital gains are ordinarily excluded
from distributable net income, and are not ordinarily considered as
"paid, credited or required to be distributed" to any beneficiary unless
they are:
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 (1956).
131 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 652.
132 See INT. RE~v. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a) (3).
133 See Berger, Taxation of Capital Gains Realized by Trusts, 12 TAx L. REv.
99 (1956).
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(1) Allocated to income under the terms of the govern-
ing instrument or local law by the fiduciary on its books or by
notice to the beneficiary,
(2) Allocated to corpus and actually distributed to bene-
ficiaries during the taxable year, or
(3) Utilized (pursuant to the terms of the governing
instrument or the practice followed by the fiduciary) in deter-
mining the amount which is distributed or required to be
distributed."3 4
Clearly, (3) is inapplicable to the "intact value" solution since
the amount to be distributed to the beneficiary is not measured by the
capital gains realized on sale. In Dravo Trust,13 5 a Pennsylvania
Orphans' Court had to consider who should bear the burden of the
federal capital gains taxes when the trustee sells stock and the proceeds
are apportioned between the current income beneficiary and the corpus
under the Pennsylvania rule. 36 The accounting for the tax, approved
by the court, indicates that the court viewed the proceeds apportioned
to the current income beneficiary as a distribution of the gains realized
on the sale of the stock. This characterization of the distribution to
the current income beneficiary accords with the function of the Penn-
sylvania rule which is to secure to the income beneficiary so much of
the proceeds from the sale of the stock, in excess of intact value, as
represents "earnings" accumulated in respect of such stock since the
inception of the trust. This reasoning is equally applicable to the
distribution of the proceeds of sale of a business required by the "intact
value' solution. Thus there is support in this case for the view that
local law would regard the distribution as capital gains. But the
reason given for this view would support the contrary conclusion when
the problem is not whether the distribution is a distribution of a tax-
able capital gain or of nontaxable corpus but whether it is a distribution
of taxable capital gain or an "accumulation distribution" governed by
the five-year "throwback" of section 666.
If the distribution of $50,000 in our example is not to be char-
acterized as a distribution of capital gains realized by the trust in the
year of sale, it is a distribution which will come under the five-year
"throwback" rule of section 666 applicable to "complex" trusts. The
$50,000 will then have to be carried back by the beneficiary into each
of the preceding five years and he will be required to report the amount
134 Treas. Reg. § 1.643 (a) -3 (a) (1956).
is 99 Pittsb. 397 (Pa. Orphans' Ct 1951).
136 Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 At. 200 (1927), extended the rule to
sale of stock.
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on his own returns to the extent that the trust had, in each of these
years, "undistributed net income" as defined in section 665. The char-
acter of the amounts thus taken into income on his own returns will
be the same as the character of the amounts constituting the trust's
undistributed net income-most likely ordinary income. Whether it
will be to the advantage of the beneficiary to have the distribution
classified as a distribution of capital gains in the year of distribution
rather than as an "accumulation distribution" depends on the amounts
of "undistributed net income" accumulated by the trust in the preceding
five years and the tax brackets of the beneficiary.
The proposed amendment to section 643 (a) (3) 17 would facilitate
for the trustee and beneficiary the choice of the alternative which pro-
duces the lowest tax. Absent this amendment, however, under the
"intact value" solution, the beneficiary stands to be exposed to a sub-
stantial tax liability under the throwback rule. There are other prob-
lems with the "intact value" solution. It does not frankly acknowledge
the right of the trustee to set up reserves for depreciation. While the
"intact value" solution has the same effect as a reserve confined to the
original assets of the business, in its treatment of replacements and ad-
ditions it is strictly a hand-to-mouth operation. This may result in
serious problems as to whether it is the beneficiary or the trust which
is entitled to depreciation deductions in any particular year.138
In addition, the "intact value" solution may result in a substantial
estate tax liability, for, if the business is not sold before the life bene-
ficiary dies, the trustee must distribute to the life beneficiary's estate
an amount equal to the difference between the intact value and the
current value of the business. The five-year throwback rule does not
apply to final distributions of a trust made more than nine years after
137 H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ; see H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-7 (1960); Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters
C, I, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the Hmose Committee on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 245-359 (1959). The amendment provides that the
capital gain will be considered "paid, credited, or required to be distributed" to the
beneficiary to the extent that "(ii) the books or records of the estate or trust ornotice to the beneficiary shows an intention to pay or credit such amounts to the
beneficiary during the taxable year" H.R. 9662, § 103(b), 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
138 Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 642(e), I6
7 (g); Treas. Reg. § 1.16 7 (g)-
1(b) (1956). Under these sections, and the regulations, the deduction would go
entirely to the current beneficiary in any year in which the trust did not make any
replacements or improvements and, therefore, paid out all of its income to the bene-
ficiary. In Kearney v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), the court,
applying the New York authorities denying depreciation on real estate held in trust
(see note 103 supra), held that the deduction inured entirely to the benefit of the
current income beneficiary and that the trust could not claim a net operating loss
deduction carryback and carryover of a loss which would have been shown only if
the trust had been allowed the deduction for depreciation. Compare Mary Jane
Little, 30 T.C. 936 (1958), rev'd, 274 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1960).
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the date of the last transfer to such trust.139 If the current income
beneficiary dies less than nine years after the date of the last transfer
to such trust, and the trustee is forced to sell the business in order to
distribute the required amount to the estate of the life tenant, all the
problems discussed with regard to capital gains would be present and
compounded by the fact that any distribution to the estate of the de-
ceased beneficiary which is not to be thrown back will be includible in
the gross estate of the beneficiary.14
The current income beneficiary may, conceivably, be able to re-
nounce or disclaim the right to the additional distribution. The
regulations state that a renunciation of ownership in property received
by gift, devise, or intestacy "within a reasonable time after learning
of the existence of the transfer," if permitted and effective under local
law, does not constitute a transfer by such person for gift tax purposes.
In any case where a refusal [renunciation or disclaimer] is
purported to relate to only a part of the property, the deter-
mination of whether or not there has been a complete and
unqualified refusal to accept ownership will depend on all
of the facts and circumstances in each particular case, taking
into account the recognition and effectiveness of such a pur-
ported refusal under local law.' 4 '
If the right to the additional distribution under the "intact value"
solution is considered as part of and indivisible from the right to cur-
rent income, there is some doubt under local law whether that part
of the right can be disclaimed or renounced.' If the right is classified
as a power of appointment or invasion, a disclaimer or renunciation
of such power-in whole or in part-is well recognized under local
law.143  If it is not so classified, some doubt remains. Under the
broad wording of section 3 of the Pennsylvania Estate Act of 1947,
clearly the current income beneficiary could disclaim the right to the
additional distribution' 44  Other statutory provisions are not so
clear.145
139 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 665 (b) (4).
140 See INT. REV. CODE- OF 1954, § 2033. This point seems to have been over-
looked in Second Nat!1 Bank v. Dallman, 209 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1954), which arose
under § 811(a) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of § 2033.
141 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (c) (1959).
142 PAGE, WILs § 1410 (3d ed. 1941).
143 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Lloyd, 160 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1947);
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Hutchinson, 22 N.J. Super. 78, 91 A2d 654
.(Ch. Div. 1952); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 AUt. 84 (1931). The matter
is now generally covered by statute. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. A.. § 46:2A-2 (Supp.
1961) ; statutes cited notes 144, 145 infra.
1 44 PA. STAT. ANN. t. 20, § 301.3 (1950).
145 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 183.
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If disclaimer or renunciation is not effective under local law, an
assignment of the right to the trust will be a transfer subject to the
gift tax and, because of the retention of the right to income from the
trust, subject also to the estate tax.146 These tax problems should not
be visited-in the name of dubious considerations of equity-on bene-
ficiaries of a trust which is operating a business.
B. Adequacy of Express Provisions in the Trust Instrument
We have seen that even a clear recognition of the power of the
trustee to set up reserves for depreciation will not suffice to keep cer-
tain businesses afloat. It may be objected that the step is as far as the
rules of trust administration should go and that the settlor must pro-
vide, if he wishes, for the setting aside of additional reserves to meet
the rising costs of replacements and improvements necessary to the
survival of his enterprise. My answer to this is that if the settlor left
the business in trust, the presumption should be that he wanted it to
survive as a going enterprise, and that he should be asked to state
explicitly that this was not his intention. There is more to this point.
Under the existing rule of trust administration, a settlor whose only
substantial asset is a profitable going enterprise, one which could
readily be administered by competent trustees in unincorporated form,
is forced to give his trustees a mandatory direction or an explicit dis-
cretion to set up additional reserves out of income. Because the local
law refuses to recognize that the legitimate needs of a going enterprise
must be met before one can arrive at what it to be regarded as dis-
tributable income, it seems clear that the mandatory direction or dis-
cretion given to the trustee is a direction or discretion to accumulate
income in the local law sense. This has the following unfavorable
consequences to the estate plan as a whole:
(1) The trust is a "complex" accumulating trust subject to the
five-year throwback if the trust terminates less than nine years after
the last transfer to it.
(2) The trust cannot be easily qualified for the marital deduction
in cases where it is considered a wise precaution that the surviving
spouse should only be given a general power of appointment by will.
The "specific portion" language of section 2056 (b) (5), new in the 1954
Code, makes it possible for a settlor to take advantage of the maximum
marital deduction although his only substantial asset is the business.
However, section 2056(b) (5) requires that the surviving spouse be
given, in addition to the general power to appoint by will, "all the
income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific por-
1 4 6 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2036.
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tion thereof." The regulations, on the question what constitutes "all
the income" state that this condition, expressed in section 2056(b) (5)
is met:
If the effect of the trust is to give her [the surviving
spouse] substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of
the trust property during her life which the principles of the
law of trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly desig-
nated as the life beneficiary of a trust. Such degree of en-
joyment is given only if it was the decedent's intention, as
manifested by the terms of the trust instrument and the
surrounding circumstances, that the trust should produce for
the surviving spouse during her life such an income, or that
the spouse should have such use of the trust property as is
consistent with the value of the trust corpus and with its
preservation. 47
The last four words of this statement are encouraging, but it is
clear from the examples later given that the Internal Revenue Service
would, at present, recognize only depreciation and depletion reserves.Y"
The warnings against giving the trustee discretion in doubtful cases
are legion. 49
(3) The estate may not be in a position to take advantage of the
provisions of section 6166," ° allowing an election to pay the estate tax
on a business interest in ten annual installments. Subsection (h) (2)
provides that if the estate has "undistributed net income," as therein
defined, for any year after its fourth taxable year, the estate must pay
an amount equal to such undistributed net income. Since the pro-
vision is confined to "estates," its application to the case where the
executor has transferred the business in trust is in doubt. The con-
gressional policy seems to have been to deny the benefit of installment
payments where it is not needed-that is, where the estate (or trust?)
is accumulating income. There is a possibility, therefore, that if the
successor trust is accumulating income, particularly if this is income
as defined by trust law, that the benefit of section 6166 may be denied
as an extension of the congressional policy expressed in subsection
(h) (2).
147 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5 (f) (1) (1959).
148Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (f) (3) (1959). The regulations require under the
"specific portion" provision that the surviving spouse's interest in the corpus and
income be expressed in terms of a "fractional or percentile share" of the whole interest.
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(c). The trust supposed may still be qualified for the
deduction, therefore, if the business requires no more than a 50/50 ratio of capitalization
to distribution. See, however, Gelb v. Commissioner, C.C.H. F D. EsT. & GIFT TAX
1112060 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1962), which rejects the regulations of this point on grounds
which seem hardly sensitive to the comparison with community property.
149 Cantwell, Tax-Wise Drafting of Fiduciary Powers, 98 TRuSTS & ESTATES
972, 975 (1959).
150 Added by 72 Stat. 1681 (1958).
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(4) The trust may involve a violation of a rule of local law pro-
hibiting accumulations of income except during the life of the settlor
and the minority of beneficiaries. This was the rule, until quite re-
cently, in Pennsylvania and New York,'51 although there is au-
thority under the pre-1959 New York law that provision made by
the trustee for amortization of an improvement does not constitute an
"accumulation" of income for purposes of the rule.'52 In In the Matter
of Estate of Adler,5 3 a lower New York court held that the retirement
of a debt and depreciation reserve out of current income by a cor-
poration solely owned by a trustee constituted unlawful accumulation.
(This case will be further discussed in Part II of this article dealing
with incorporated enterprises in trust.) Under the pre-1959 New
York law, a settlor might have escaped the rule against accumulations
by vesting the trustee with a discretionary power over distributions of
income. However, the cases arrived at this result only by dint of
stating that the current income beneficiary has a vested right to the
undistributed amounts-with, obviously, unfortunate estate tax
consequences.
C. The Only Answer-A NVe Rule
I cannot accept with equanimity the position that if the under-
lying law of trusts does not make adequate provision for the survival
of the business the settlor can. I believe, rather, that the problems
discussed thus far would be avoided or substantially diminished through
a clear recognition by the law of trust administration that, in the
absence of a contrary intention shown by the settlor, the trustee who
is authorized or directed to continue a business enterprise is required
(a) to set up reserves for depreciation and (b) to the extent that such
reserves will be insufficient to meet the needs of the business as a
going concern, to set up additional reserves for this purpose. The
authorization to set up additional reserves can be hedged in by the
following safeguards: If in any year the authorized retention of what
amounts to surplus results in a return to the current income beneficiary
which is less than the return which may be obtained by selling the
business and investing the proceeds in other investments authorized
' 5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 172 (now N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 16) ; Pa. Laws
1947, act 39, § 6 (now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6 (Supp. 1960)). For laws in
other jurisdictions, see SimES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1466 (2d ed. 1956).
152 In the Matter of Nesmith, 140 N.Y. 609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894). Compare Pa.
Laws 1947, act 39, § 6(8) (c).
153 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
154 Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391, 173 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1918) ; Application
of Bank of New York, 99 N.Y.S2d 413 (Surr. Ct 1950). Compare Emma Earle,
5 T.C. 991 (1945), aff'd, 157 F2d 501 (6th Cir. 1946).
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to the trustee, under the governing instrument or local law, the
trustee should be under a duty to apply to the court for instructions
whether to sell or retain the business. The court then can make such
order regarding the continued administration of the trust as it finds
appropriate under the circumstances. The trustee's authority to set
up additional reserves to meet the needs of the business should be
strictly confined by the trustee's duty of impartiality between successive
beneficiaries to reserves necessary to preserve the going concern value
of the enterprise but not for indiscriminate expansion. The additional
reserves should be regarded as "corpus," not "income," under local
law.
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I believe that such a rule would accord more nearly with the
normal intentions of a testator. It would make available to the estate
planner a medium for preserving the testator's businesses in cases in
which incorporation will serve little purpose except to increase the tax
liability of the estate.
It seems fairly certain that my proposal to shift the local-law line
drawn between "principal" and "income" to a more realistic position
for going enterprises held in trust avoids the problem with the marital
deduction. It certainly avoids the problem of unlawful accumulations
under local law.
Under such a shift, there is a good chance that the trust holding
an unincorporated business will not be regarded as a "complex" or
accumulating trust. This comes from the reference in section 643 (b)
to the "local law" on what constitutes "income." It is clear from the
recent Kintner regulations, 50 as well as from antecedent cases, that
a normal testamentary trust, even though it operates a business, will
not be classified as an "association" taxable as a corporation. 57 It
155 If the trustee finds that he has overestimated the level of reserves necessary,
he should pay out some of them as current income. I would reject, however, the impli-
cation of the cases which hold that upon the liquidation of a corporation held in trust
the income beneficiary is entitled to depreciation reserves which proved unnecessary in
view of the price obtained for the liquidated assets. McCahan's Estate, 18 Pa. D. &
C. 171 (Orphans' Ct.), revid on other grounds, 312 Pa. 515, 168 Atl. 685 (1933);
Estate of Mathews, 210 Wis. 109, 245 N.W. 122 (1932). I heartily agree with the
dissent of Van Dusen, J., in McCaban's Estate, supra at 181.
156Treas. Reg. §301.7701 (1960); see Wolfman & Price, Qualifying Under
Final Kintner Rules Will Be Difficult in Most States, 14 J. TAxAT oN 105 (1961).
The reference is to United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
'.57 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1960); see Morrissey v. Commissioner, 299 U.S.
344, 356-57 (dictum). Compare Scofield v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154, 165-66
(6th Cir. 1959). There is grave danger in this area when the trustee pursues the
practice of obtaining the beneficiary's consent to reinvestment of earnings for replace-
ments and improvements-a favorite practice of trustees who are pressed by the rule
of trust administration which makes such reinvestment impossible. See Commissioner
v. Guitar Trust Estate, 72 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1934), and particularly its sequel,
Guitar Trust Estate, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 312 (1942). The Tax Court's decision
rested on Harry E. Lyman, 36 B.T.A. 161 (1937). The Commissioner has since
withdrawn acquiescence in Lyman. Rev. Rul. 57-534, 1957-2 Cum. BuL.. 924.
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might, therefore, be objected that to give recognition to a "local law"
which permits gross income to be reinvested in a business as "prin-
cipal," without exposing subsequent distributions to the five-year
throwback, would be to create another "tax shelter" in this area.
If we compare the position of a sole proprietor with that of a
beneficiary of a trust, both of whom have no other source of income,
it is true that the trust would always be at an advantage over the sole
proprietor except in the case where it plows back all of its profits or
distributes all of its profits. 5 " This is so because the profits of the
enterprise would be split between two taxpayers in the trust situation.
In that situation, the trust would obtain the highest advantage over
the sole proprietor when it keeps a fifty-fifty ratio of capitalization to
distribution. However, the trust, strictly confined to capitalization
essential to the preservation and survival of the enterprise and subject
to the trustee's duty to make the corpus productive of income, may
be expected to continue a high ratio of distribution to capitalization.
It should be noted that in that situation, the trust is in a very poor
position if it is forced to operate the business in corporate form. This
is the situation in which subchapter S (which was enacted in 1958 to
permit closely held corporate enterprises to elect to be taxed substan-
tially like partnerships 159) offers bona fide relief to closely held cor-
porate enterprise, but for reasons which are not recorded,"' subchapter
S denies the election to corporations any of whose shares are held
by a trust.
On the other hand, if the business is of the kind which, in order
to survive, must preserve a high ratio of capitalization to distribution,
the trust holding such business in sole proprietorship is at a substantial
158 The following table shows the total tax paid by a corporation and its sole
shareholder, by a trust and its sole current income beneficiary, and by a sole proprietor,
in respect of $50,000 taxable income retained and distributed as shown in the left-
hand column. Standard deduction and personal exemptions are ignored, and it is
assumed that the shareholder and beneficiary have no other source of income.
Corporation Trust & Sole
Retained Distributed &' Shareholder Beneficiary Proprietor
0 $50,000 $42,820 $26,820 $26,820
$10,000 40,000 36,140 22,380 26,820
20,000 30,000 30,020 20,480 26,820
25,000 25,000 27,150 20,300 26,820
30,000 20,000 24,460 20,480 26,820
40,000 10,000 20,240 22,380 26,820
50,00 0 18,000 26,820 26,820
1 59 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a) (2), added by 72 Stat 1650 (1958); see
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, 216 (1958) ; Anderson, To Elect or Not
to Elect: Advantages of Subchapter S Corporations, 99 TRuSTS & ESTATES 96 (1960);
Harrison, Pitfalls in Electing, 99 TRuSTS & ESTATES 98 (1960) ; Moore & Sorlien,
Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L. Rxv. 453 (1959).
160 See Comment, Subchapter S: A New Concept in the Tax Status of Business
Associations, 44 CoaNuFi L.Q. 560, 562 (1959). The authors surmise that the exclu-
sion "was intended to reduce the complexities of administering the new subsection."
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disadvantage over the sole proprietor. This is the situation for which
the election of section 1361 is available to the sole proprietor ... but,
again, not to a trust.
Moreover, the question at issue is whether the trust is to be per-
mitted to capitalize such profits of the business as are essential to its
survival and preservation free of the five-year throwback. A trust
which, by its terms, is to continue for more than nine years or whose
life beneficiary survives for more than nine years is, by virtue of the
present exception to the throwback, free to capitalize at whatever rate
will produce the lowest tax.
If the rule which I advocate is adopted, a recognition that a trust
which is operating a business and capitalizing enough of its earnings to
guarantee its survival and preservation, but no more, is not a complex
trust does not, it seems to me, create a special "tax shelter." If the
accumulation exceeds the strict test provided for by local law, the
Commissioner can take advantage of this. The test certainly fur-
nishes him with a more sensitive control than do sections 532-37 for
corporate accumulations.' 62
I believe that the unrealistic position at which the line is drawn
between "principal" and "income" in the case of a business held in
trust is driving most estate planners to incorporation. As I plan to
show in Part II of this article, the pressures generated by the present
position of that line can interfere substantially with the successful op-
eration of a business by a trustee-even though incorporated. I recog-
nize that the present trend in favor of incorporation when the business
is to be retained in trust is suggested by a number of additional con-
siderations,"8 3 but the one factor which should play no part in this
161 INT. IEV. CoDE OF 1954, § 1361 provides that a partnership or sole proprietor
may elect to be taxed as a corporation. See McNaughton, To Be Taxed as a Cor-
poration, 33 TAXES 253 (1955); Moore, Should Your Btsiness Be Taxed as a
Corporation?, 33 TAXEs 258 (1955).
162 The Service has abandoned its 70% test for post-1954 years. T.D. 6378,
1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 680 (the rules adopted in T.D. 4914, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 108, not
applicable under the 1954 Code). Bona fide plans for expansion, if carried out, are
sanctioned. Cases holding that the corporation was "availed of the purposes of pre-
venting the imposition of" the surtax are fairly extreme cases. I. A. Dress Co. v.
Commissioner, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960) (accumu-
lations for purchase of leasehold reversion unsupported by evidence that landlord
would sell or that any negotiations were in progress) ; American Metal Prods. Corp.,
34 T.C. 89 (1960) (proposed purchase of steel never made) ; R. Gsell & Co., 34 T.C.
41 (1960) (ratio of current assets to current liabilities 12 to 1 in 1948, 20 to 1 in
1949-50, 17 to 1 in 1952).
163 trustee who holds an unincorporated business is exposed to personal
liability on all obligations of the business to which he is necessarily a party, unless
he specifically contracts this liability away. 3 ScoTt, TRUSTS § 262 (2d ed. 1956).
(In the case of negotiable instruments, however, § 20 of the UmFORm NEoTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW and § 3-403 of the UNIFORm CommRcAI. CODE substitute for the
common-law requirement of express contract against personal liability the require-
ment that the fiduciary must merely show that he is signing in a representative
capacity. Pennsylvania has extended this treatment to all written contracts of the
fiduciary. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.522, .939 (1950).) He continues to be
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choice is an unrealistic, outmoded underlying rule of trust
administration.
liable also for torts connected with the business, even though he is not personally at
fault 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 264, 265.4 (2d ed. 1956). This result obtains notwith-
standing court approval for continued administration of the business. E.g., Johnston
v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947). Statutes conferring a power on the
courts to grant limited liability to the trustee vary greatly in scope. Compare PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.934 (1950), with MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(646) (1943).
But the trustee's liability is cushioned by his right of indemnification against the trust
estate. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 244-45.1, 246-47 (2d ed. 1956). Unforeseen liabilities in
tort in excess of the trust assets may be guarded against through insurance at the
expense of the trust estate. See id. § 264. Moreover, the trustee is not in business to
make a killing. There is nothing in trust law to encourage him to take the kind of
risks which drive businesses into bankruptcy. In fact, the suggested rule for businesses
will discourage outside financing of expansion and require the trustee to sell the
business if it cannot provide its own risk capital and produce a reasonable return
thereon. I am not satisfied, therefore, that the law ought to discourage operations
in unincorporated form. It is clear that incorporation may involve serious tax dis-
advantages, particularly because the subchapter S election is not available to the
trustee. If the business is operated by an institutional trustee, the problem that
"fringe benefits" are not available to owners without incorporation is absent. And
it is worth noting, in relation to the last suggestion, that corporate fiduciaries have
perhaps begun to reconsider their traditional distaste for unincorporated businesses.
See Chapman, Business Interests and Widening Horizons for Property Management,
94 TRUSTS & EsTATES 1020 (1955); Durand, Changing Concepts of Trust Invest-
ments-Retention of Decedent's Business, 95 TRusTs & ESTATES 907 (1956).
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